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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this reflection – Dignity across borders: Rethinking the protection of 
refugees and IDPs from an ethical perspective – has been to challenge contemporary ways of 
thinking and dealing with issues related to refugees and IDPs. Today, refugees and IDPs are often 
reduced to their needs. They are often perceived as bodies to shelter, to heal or to clothe; mouths to 
feed; victims of persecution to protect, etc. In the same perspective, contemporary debates on 
treatments of refugees and IDPs tend to rotate around the financial costs of processing claims, social 
security benefits for asylum seekers, and social tensions arising from the presence of large numbers 
of refugees and IDPs in receiving countries or communities. While acknowledging the importance of 
all these issues and needs, the stance of this reflection has been to refocus the debate on the concept 
of human dignity which transcends borders such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, race, etc. From 
this standpoint, the debate changes and gains more fundamental and moral depths. 
From the same stance, but grounded in the biblical experience, the Roman Catholic Church‘s 
social discourse on refugees and IDPs challenges the current international refugee protection regime. 
Because all are created in the image and likeness of God, all humans share the same dignity. Their 
dignity and their rights as humans are not related to their citizenship, but to the fact that they have 
been born into the human family. This is the foundation of Christian universalism that challenges the 
current refugee protection regime that is based on the membership of states. Yet, Christian 
universalism includes also a realism that respects the state sovereignty within its borders. 
Conversely, the main claim of Catholic social teachings on refugee issues is that the refugee issues 
should not be perceived only from the standpoint of the state, such as national security concern and 
borders control. Above all, refugees should be perceived as human beings, as dignities across 
borders. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION:  THE BORDERED DIGNITY OF REFUGEES AND IDPS 
 
1.0- Introduction 
 
In order to establish the importance and the interest of this topic, I will try to depict the 
figure of the refugee and the internally displaced person (hereafter, IDP). I will explain how 
being a refugee or an IDP means to have a bordered dignity. That is why the statement of 
purpose of this thesis will be centered on the protection of refugee dignity from threats that 
works against it. The opening chapter will define the object of the research and the main 
concepts, and also the field of research in which this reflection will be grounded. Moreover, 
it will briefly present the methodology through the models of ethics that will be applied in 
this research. Finally, this chapter will introduce the main argument of the whole thesis and 
will explain how I will proceed to develop this main argument through the chapters of the 
thesis. The aim of this introductory chapter is to define the scope and the goal of this study 
about the protection of refugees and IDPs dignity within and beyond national borders. 
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1.1- Threats to the Dignity of Refugees and IDPs 
 
To be a refugee or an IDP is to be in an extremely vulnerable situation.
1
 Yet, there 
are some refugees who have favorable conditions of life. However, the majority among them 
and especially those from Africa have very hard conditions of life. Let us illustrate this by 
quoting Judy Mayotte who gave this powerful and poignant account of Ethiopian refugees 
fleeing the war in 1984:  
Men and women, old and young, their numbers legion, appeared on our television screens. 
Barefooted men, raggedly clothed, carried cloth-wrapped bundles on their heads. Each 
seemed to have a walking stick and a plastic water jug. Women and children mingled farther 
behind, their clothing torn and soiled. On their veiled heads, they carried woven baskets, 
water jugs, and clay cooking vessels. Children, too tired or too small to walk, rode in shawls 
tied around their mothers‘ backs. They stopped in barren, sandy, practically treeless areas. 
They clustered their few belongings close to them and gathered what wood they could find. 
The men poked sticks into the ground and hung thin cloths – poor shelter from the burning 
sun or cold desert nights. 
We saw them tired, sick, hungry, frightened, and dying. They sat enervated, too weak to 
brush flies from their gaunt faces. We watched in horror as children with bone-tight skin and 
bloated bellies died in their mothers‘ emaciated arms. Others, too listless to cry, could not get 
milk from their mothers‘ dry breasts. Epidemics hit old and young alike in overcrowded, 
unsanitary, hastily established camps. We sent relief and watched until our eyes could take 
no more. We too were enervated. We moved on to other stories.
2
 
 
What is said here about Ethiopian refugees in the nineteen-eighties is still true today 
for refugees of the Great Lakes in Africa, for those in Sudan, in Chad, in Liberia, etc. When 
you visit a refugee camp, you can easily read the anxiety, the frustration and the humiliation 
on refugees‘ faces. They have been disfigured by suffering, sickness, poverty, injustice, 
                                               
1 See David Hollenbach, ed., Refugee Rights. Ethics, Advocacy, and Africa (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2008), 5. 
2 Judy A. Mayotte, Disposable people? The Plight of Refugees (Maryknoll & New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 
2-3. 
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violence, hatred, and so forth. Their dignity, as humans, is at stake by the fact that refugees 
are subject to many threats: 
 
Threats in their own country: Refugees and IDPs have no protection from their own 
state, or they are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their state which usually 
constitutes the main threat to their security. This is, for example, the case of some tribes in 
Darfur who cannot rely on the Sudanese government to protect them, and who either have 
crossed national borders in order to find protection in Chad, or are internally displaced 
people in Sudan. Refugees and IDPs are often by-products of ―failed-states‖ that are unable 
or unwilling to provide security to all their citizens.  They are fleeing lands devastated by 
war, or by oppression, famine, poverty, and other threats to their lives.
3
 It is evident that 
such situations burden their dignity as humans. 
 
Threats in the host country: Nowadays, former host countries become less and less 
generous in welcoming refugees. Their traditional hospitality has been replaced by 
restrictive policies, for the reason that the sociopolitical and economic costs of dealing with 
                                               
3 The causes of refugee plights are very divers and complex even if political causes and especially war is the 
main cause. As the UNHCR states: ―The security of many people is currently being threatened by a complex 
mixture of factors: by unbalanced development, economic decline and environmental degradation; by state 
collapse, state formation and the authoritarian exercise of state power; and by new forms of violence and 
warfare, which, although based in many instances on communal allegiances, also serve as camouflage for 
personal or factional gain.‖ See UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees 1997-1998. A Humanitarian 
Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 27. For a deeper analysis about the causes of the plight of 
IDPs and refugees, see Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity. International Cooperation and the Global Refugee 
Crisis (New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chapter 1: Refugee Movements: Causes and 
consequences.  
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refugee issues have become a heavy burden to bear.  And there is theoretically no room to 
compel a country to welcome refugees. In fact, even though the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights acknowledges the right to emigrate, it does not acknowledge the right to 
immigrate which still is a matter of national sovereignty. As Michael Walzer explained this 
paradox, ―The restraint of entry serves to defend the liberty and welfare, the politics and 
culture of a group of people committed to one another and to their common life. But the 
restraint of exit replaces commitment with coercion.‖4 It is therefore difficult for refugees to 
cross national borders. Even when refugees succeeded in crossing national borders, they are 
not always safe. As Pecoud rightly states, ―[Forced] migrants are not only banned from 
entering a country; once they are in, they are often inhibited in their participation and 
incorporation in the receiving society, particularly in terms of welfare, rights and 
citizenship.‖5  That is why it is no exaggeration to say that refugee dignity is bordered and 
limited by very complex factors.  
 
Threats in the way that they are defined: The situation of forced migrants has changed 
while the international regime of legal and humanitarian protection has not evolved. There 
are new forms of forced migrants who do not fit the concept of refugee in the international 
legal system.
6
 For instance, in 2008, there were about 11.4 million refugees who crossed 
national borders because of persecution or war, and who legitimately claim to be refugees 
                                               
4 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Robertson, 1983), 39. 
5 Antoine Pecoud and Paul de Guchteneire, ed., Migration without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of 
People (Paris: UNESCO Publishing & New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 20. 
6 I will analysis the concept of refugee in the international legal system below. 
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according to the international legal system. But there were also about 26 million people who 
have been displaced for man-made reasons inside the borders of their own countries, and 
who are refugee-like people. In this context, the concept of refugee is becoming a limited 
concept. In fact, there are other categories of people who need international protection, in 
addition to refugees, including asylum-seekers, returnees, stateless persons, and internally 
displaced people. So, forced migration nowadays cannot be reduced to refugees, but to all 
these categories of people. Failing to provide protection to all these categories of refugee-
like people will result in a huge threat to the lives of many millions of people. 
 
Threats in the ways that refugees and IDPs themselves behave: Refugees and refugee-
like people often constitute a threat for themselves and for others. They are not always 
innocent people. It can happen that some refugees are former warriors who are fleeing 
because they have lost the fight. Some of them might have committed grave violations of 
human rights. Therefore, they are not always victims; some have been torturers and 
executioners. One of the things which strikes visitors to refugee camps is the presence of 
violence in refugee behaviors even toward people who are helping refugees. Sometime, this 
situation explains why some volunteers who worked in refugee camps do not want to 
continue. That is why restoring or preserving refugee dignity does not mean idealizing the 
state of being a refugee; but to be able to interact with refugees in order to encourage 
progress in their behavior. For instance, one of the features of the Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS) is to criticize refugees. As Dieter Scholz of the JRS pointed out: ―It sounds shocking, 
but the closed environment of the camp creates a hothouse for ideas and distorted 
6 
 
interpretations. Only someone who is accepted and trusted can introduce a dose of reality 
and criticise the unreal interpretations of the refugees. Moreover only someone who is well 
informed and has a balanced judgment can play this role.‖7  
 
1.2- Thesis Statement 
 
Above all, one of the most important threats to refugee dignity, something that this 
thesis especially wants to address, is the threat present in the ways that problems related to 
refugees and IDPs are responded to by those seeking to end them. Refugees, very often, are 
dealt with as if they were only victims of persecution to protect, mouths to feed, bodies to 
shelter and to heal, etc. In the way that many policies deal with refugees and, in general, 
with forced migration issues, the focus is often on the technical aspects of the issues, that is 
to say, the focus is generally on the political, or humanitarian, and social aspects, etc. This 
focus does not always take seriously into consideration what is behind these technical 
aspects, that is, the forced migrant himself/herself as a human person.  
In other terms, behind any dimension of forced migration issues, there is human 
dignity which should be considered. As Christoph Schwöbel states, ―on the one hand, the 
notion of human dignity is affirmed as a foundational principle of society. In some cases … 
                                               
7 See Jesuit Refugee Service, Everybody’s Challenge. Essential Documents of Jesuit Refugee Service. 1980-
2000 (Rome: Jesuit Refugee Service, 2000), 88. 
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the principle that the dignity of the human person is inviolable is solemnly stated in [states‘ 
constitutions]. On the other hand, we encounter a profound insecurity with regard to the 
practical application of the principle in most spheres of social and personal life,‖ 8 and 
especially in issues related to forced migration. 
 
Regarding the issue of forced migration, borders constitute one of the important 
threats to the practical application of the recognition of the principle of dignity to forced 
migrants. ―Bordering‖, according to D. Jacobson, ―has become more multifaceted, taking on 
both geographic and non-geographic forms, of social, political, and economic characters.‖9 
To be a forced migrant, means to cross borders like racial, national, religious, class, clan, 
even family and other kinds of boundaries. That is why it is important to reflect on borders 
that forced migrants have to cross and to try to find the best way to relate to these borders so 
that the dignity of forced migrants may be preserved. From this perspective, the title of this 
research is: ―Dignity across Borders: Rethinking the Protection of Refugees and IDPs from 
an Ethical perspective.‖ Let us provide more details about the object and the purpose of the 
research. 
 
                                               
8 Christoph Schwöbel, ―Recovering Human Dignity,‖ in God and Human Dignity, ed., R. Kendall Soulen and 
L. Woodhead, (Grand rapids & Michigan, USA / Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2006), 44. 
9 D. Jacobson, ―The global political culture,‖ in Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations 
Theory, ed., M. Albert, D. Jacobson, and Y. Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 161-
79. See p.161. 
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1.3- Research Object and main concepts 
 
The object of this research is not the principle of dignity itself nor the concept of 
border, but the relation between human dignity and borders in the protection of refugees and 
IDPs. The main concepts are therefore: ―refugee, ―IDP‖, ―human dignity‖, ―protection of 
refugees and IDPs‖, and ―borders‖. 
 
*Human dignity 
 
The notion of human dignity is widespread in many discourses, whether theological, 
ethical, legal, philosophical, cultural, or political. Although there is a consensus that human 
dignity is a fundamental value and therefore is worth protecting at any rate, human dignity 
remains a contested notion. Scholars are divided on the source of human dignity. Is human 
dignity grounded in the human being himself/herself or is it grounded in God or something 
else? Likewise, what is the content of the notion of human dignity? Is human dignity only an 
abstract moral principle or does it have an objective content? Finally, is it possible to 
reconcile the different understandings of personhood that each conception of human dignity 
implies? I will briefly try to elucidate these questions while defining the meaning of human 
dignity that will be applied to this study. 
 
9 
 
Relating to the source of human dignity, there are basically two approaches. On one 
hand, there is the liberal secular tradition that conceives human dignity as being intrinsic to 
humanity. On the other hand, there is the religious tradition that conceives human dignity as 
being extrinsic to humanity in the sense that the source of human dignity is in God. 
According to the liberal secular tradition, human dignity is grounded in the person 
considered as being a ―substantial self‖. Here, human dignity is related to human nature 
from which we derive all value and meaning. Human dignity is conceived therefore on an 
internal basis or from an autonomous perspective where the human being has the right and 
the power of self-government.
10
 Immanuel Kant is one of the most representative scholars 
who conceive human dignity in such an autonomous way. As Solen and Woodhead wrote:  
Kant argues that the incomparable dignity of human being (Würde) derives from the fact that 
he alone is ‗free from all laws of nature, obedient only to those laws which he himself 
prescribes.‘ Capacity of autonomous rational agency is the root of human dignity, which in 
turn requires that all persons be treated and that they treat themselves as ends in themselves 
and never merely as a means to an other‘s end.11 
 
This understanding of human dignity underlies contemporary democracies based on 
the rule of the people and which operates by the people. This conception also underlies the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and contemporary western culture, where 
the individual plays a prominent role. From this liberal perspective, human dignity stands on 
                                               
10 See Knut Wenzel, ―Radical Subjectivity,‖ International Review of Mission 95, no. 378/379 (July/October 
2006): 259-264. See also Oswald Bayer, ―Self-creation? On the Dignity of Human Beings?‖ Modern Theology 
20, no 2 (April 2004): 275-290. 
11 K. Solen and L. Woodhead, ―Contextualizing Human Dignity,‖ in God and Human Dignity, ed., R. Kendall 
Soulen and L. Woodhead, (Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), 
10-11. 
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its own and is best expressed through personal autonomy and personal liberty. The idea of 
any dependence, either on God or on the society, is evacuated. For this reason, the liberal 
secular ideal of human dignity may have some difficulties to support the dignity of people 
whose autonomy and freedom have been undermined.
12
 The dignity of IDPs, refugees, and 
disabled people, who often cannot stand on their own, raises questions.  Indeed, liberal 
secular tradition has done much to protect human dignity by recognizing and protecting 
human rights. However, its ideal of human dignity can be improved. I agree with T. 
Minnema who states that:  
Our ideal of human dignity needs to incorporate the reality of dependence. Human 
dependence ought not to be regarded as a weakness to which we at times have to resign 
ourselves. It must be given the status of a foundational virtue on all levels of life, both social 
and individual.13 
 
Judaeo-Christian tradition and other religious traditions have integrated this dimension 
of dependence in their conception of human dignity. For Christians, human dignity is rooted 
in God. Therefore, human dignity is not a self-grounded possession; it is not intrinsic to the 
human being. Human dignity pertains both to the fact that humans have been created by God 
in a special act of creation, and to the fact that they have been configured in the image of 
God. Fundamentally and theologically speaking, human dignity is received as a gift from 
                                               
12 See Hans S. Reinders, ―Human Dignity in the Absence of Agency,‖ in God and Human Dignity, ed., R. 
Kendall Soulen and L. Woodhead, 121-139. 
13Theodore Minnema, ―Human Dignity and Human Dependence,‖ Convocation address delivered at Calvin 
Theological Seminary on September 3, 1980, p.12. 
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God.
14
 This gift is granted to all human beings without exception. According to the Second 
Vatican Council,
15
 the dignity of the person is an inherent worth which can never be 
disposed of because it is intrinsically related to the human person as a creature of God. 
Despite the fact that man can go astray in a variety of ways, he will never lose this dignity. 
 
For Christians, Jesus Christ is the one who reveals the highest summit of human 
dignity. As the Second Vatican Council states: ―Whoever follows after Christ, the perfect 
man, becomes himself more of a man.‖16  Since the Incarnation of Christ, human dignity is 
elevated to divine dignity. Likewise, all human beings share the benefits of Christ‘s 
redemption.
17
 From this perspective, human dignity has an eschatological dimension in the 
sense that human dignity will find its full expression in the communion with God in Christ 
through the Holy Spirit.
18
 
 
Here, the important idea to outline is the transcendental dimension of human dignity. 
Let us point out only two consequences of this transcendental dimension: At first, since 
human dignity is a gift from God, its norm resides not in social convention but in God and in 
                                               
14 See this article of Damian P. Fedoryka, ―The Concept of ‗Gift‘ as Hermeneutical Key to the Dignity of the 
Human Person,‖ Logos 11, no.1 (Winter 2008): 49-69.  
15 See Second Vatican Council, ―Gaudium et Spes,‖ no .16. 
16 Ibid., no. 41. 
17 Ibid., no. 22. 
18 See Wolf Krotke, ―Hope in the Last Judgement and Human Dignity,‖ International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 2, no. 3 (November 2000): 270-282. 
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the pattern of God‘s action toward humankind in creation and redemption in Christ.19 For 
this reason, social conventions are not above human dignity. Human dignity remains the key 
value for the appreciation of social institutions and conventions. However, secondly, human 
dignity has a communal rather than an individual horizon because it is related to God and to 
all the creation. There is a fundamental solidarity between humans because they are all 
God‘s creatures so that human dignity cannot be achieved in autarky, but in relation.  Thus, 
being a human means ―being as communion.‖20 
 
To complete the definition of human dignity, let us try to clarify its content. Does 
human dignity have an objective content? For some thinkers, the main feature of human 
dignity is freedom. This is the case with Kant as quoted above.
21
 Although freedom is an 
important feature of human dignity, the latter cannot be reduced to the first. Otherwise, it 
will be almost impossible to render an account of the dignity of these people who cannot 
exercise their freedom because they have been deprived of it by others, or because they do 
not have the capability to enjoy it.  
 
                                               
19 See K. Solen and L. Woodhead, ―Contextualizing Human Dignity,‖ 6. 
20 See John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood & New 
York: St. Vladimir‘s Seminary Press, 1985), 36-37. 
21 Before Kant, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) was one of the thinkers who outlined freedom as 
the content of human dignity. See his book, De dignitate hominis (On the Dignity of Man), translated by 
Charles G. Wallis (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965).   
13 
 
Likewise, other thinkers relate human dignity to rationality. Blaise Pascal, for 
instance, wrote: ―The human being is obviously made for thinking; therein lies all his 
dignity and merit.‖22  In other words, René Descartes wrote: ―Cogito, ergo sum,‖23 that is, ―I 
think, therefore I am.‖ Here again, there is a threat to the dignity of people with disabilities, 
for example, who do not possess the faculties of using their rationality.  
 
So, these examples suggest that we should not identify human dignity with any 
specific human quality, or aspect, of dimension. In fact, to identify human dignity, for 
instance, with reason, freedom, race, religion, etc., will inescapably result in a reduction that 
threatens the humanity of some people, namely people with disabilities, or people in difficult 
conditions such as refuges and IDPs. The whole of the human is endowed with dignity, since 
dignity is an absolute anthropological trait of persons as human beings. Accordingly, human 
dignity does not rely on what a person can do or cannot do, or on what a person can have or 
cannot have.  
  
All things considered, in this reflection, human dignity will be understood as human 
worthiness that transcends the person herself and that implies God and all God‘s creation. 
Moreover, the fact of being born out of humans is the necessary and sufficient reason to be 
considered as a human person. This theological-based approach finds a common ground 
                                               
22 Blaise Pascal quoted by K. Solen and L. Woodhead, ―Contextualizing Human Dignity,‖ 10. 
23 See René Descartes, Discourse on Method 1637 (Pomona: Pomona Press, 2006), Part 1, article 7. 
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with the liberal secular approach by considering human dignity as the core value upon which 
rights and duties are grounded. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of the 
objective common grounds for religious and secular approaches to acknowledge and foster 
human dignity.
24
 For this reason, this reflection on the dignity of refugees and IDPs will 
privilege a human-rights based approach. However, the recognized and conventional human 
rights do not contain all the reality of human dignity which is and will remain a principle 
and a horizon that should guide and challenge the behaviors of individuals and communities, 
and social conventions. 
 
*Refugees and IDPs 
 
I will use a broad definition of the concept of refugee, meaning all those people who 
have fled their country because of persecution, war, and humanitarian disaster. The notion of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) will be used to refer to the category of people who fled 
their homes for the same reasons as refugees but who do not cross national frontiers. They 
still live in their country, but they share the same difficulties and conditions with refugees.  
 
                                               
24 See David Hollenbach, ―An Advocate for All. How the Catholic Church promotes human dignity,‖ America, 
no.4837 (December 1, 2008): 14-16. See also Michael Novak, ―Human Dignity, Human Rights,‖ First Things, 
no. 97 (November 1999): 39-42. 
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The document ―Refugees: A Challenge to Solidarity,‖25 one of the most significant 
documents of Catholic social teaching on refugee issues, uses the term ―Refugee‖ to 
designate both ―conventional refugees‖ and IDPs and refugee-like people. However, in this 
research, I will distinguish refugees and IDPs, because the international laws and the ways 
to address issues related to refugees or IDPs are substantially different. For example, 
because of state sovereignty within its borders, it is very difficult to provide relief to 
internally displaced people who are trapped within the borders of their own country. 
 
Although refugees and IDPs are part of the larger movement of migrants, they 
constitute a specific category of migrants that is called ―forced migrants‖. In fact, migrants, 
especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to improve the future prospects for 
themselves and their families.  On the contrary, refugees have to move if they are to save 
their lives or preserve their freedom. However, changes in policies related to migrants 
always affect the way that refugee issues are dealt with. That is why we should have in mind 
the entire context of migration, even if we will focus on forced migration. Next, we will 
clarify what we mean by ―protection of refugees and IDPs‖. 
 
                                               
25 According to the document Refugees: A Challenge to Solidarity, ―For humanitarian reasons these displaced 
people should be considered as refugees in the same way as those formally recognized by the Convention 
because they are victims of the same type of violence.‖ See Pontifical Council ‗Cor Unum‘ and Pontifical 
Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, Refugees: A Challenge to Solidarity (Vatican: 
Vatican Editions, 1992), § 5. 
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*Protection of refugees and IDPs 
  
Usually protection of refugees refers to legal protection which basically means to 
grant asylum
26
. Asylum includes assuring physical security, providing redress under law, 
providing humanitarian standards of living conditions, and respect for the principle of non-
refoulement (non-return to a place of prospective persecution). Although granting asylum is 
a very effective way to provide protection to refugees, I agree with Arthur Helton who 
thinks that refugee protection should not be reduced to asylum. Helton suggests 
understanding protection as a broad humanitarian principle which means: ―to secure the 
enjoyment of basic human rights and meet primarily humanitarian needs.‖27 Loren Landau 
also suggests conceptualizing protection as capability expansion. According to Landau, the 
―capability approach… is dedicated to expanding agency – the ability to choose different 
ways of living – while ensuring that fundamental prerequisites for survival are never 
compromised.‖28  
                                               
26 As Loren B. Landau noted: ―From the UNHCR‘s interpretation, protection is, inter alia, physical security, 
avoidance of torture or refoulement, and an adequate and dignified means of subsistence.‖ See Loren B. 
Landau, ―Protection as Capability Expansion. Practical Ethics for Assisting Urban Refugees,‖ in Refugee 
Rights: Ethics, Advocacy, and Africa, ed., David Hollenbach (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2008), 109. 
27 Arthur C. Helton, ―What is Refugee Protection? A Question Revisited,‖ Problems of Protection. The 
UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights, ed. Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil Loescher (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2003), 26. 
28 Loren B. Landau, ―Protection as Capability Expansion: Practical Ethics for Assisting Urban Refugees,‖ 104. 
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It is best to understand refugee protection as including everything that can preserve 
and restore refugees‘ dignity as full humans.29 That is to include basic human rights, 
humanitarian standards of life, but also the way that all these reliefs are provided to 
refugees, and the way that refugees are seen and defined through laws, academic definitions, 
etc. From this dignity-preserving based approach, refugee protection consists not only in 
providing relief, but also in particular ways of doing and being with refugees with respect of 
their dignity as human beings. This approach helps to prevent reducing refugee issues to 
only technical issues but to consider refugee issues as being always a human problem where 
human dignity is at stake. In the same way, IDPs‘ protection has the same requirements as 
for refugees with respect to their dignity as humans. However, IDPs‘ protection will have an 
emphasis on monitoring of human rights violations in countries of origin in the hopes of 
stemming the sources of IDPs and refugees‘ plight. 
   
*Borders  
 
In this research, I will use the term border both from a geographical and from a non-
geographical perspective. From the geographical perspective, border will refer to the frontier 
                                               
29 This definition echoes the UNHCR‘s Cluster Working Group on Protection, which defines the protection as 
―all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the 
spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law).‖ 
(Inter-agency Standing Committee Principals Meeting, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 12 December 2005, Cluster 
Working Group on Protection Progress Report, 3. Available from: http://eos.io/pcwg/PCWG-report-dec05.pdf; 
accessed on December 31, 2009). 
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line, the boundary line which separates one country from another, and which defines the 
territory within which a government can exercise its sovereignty by conferring citizenship 
and by organizing public affairs on this territory. This territorial border is called a national 
border because it really defines the state, and distinguishes it from other states. From the 
non-geographical perspective, border will designate the interiorized boundary line which 
defines the identity and the sense of belonging to one specific group rather than to another. 
Here, border will refer, for instance, to racial border, ethnic border, religious border, class 
border, etc. One of the main purposes of this reflection will be to reinterpret the concept of 
border in relation to refugee and IDP issues. After having defined the object and the 
principal concepts and notions of this research, I would like now to define the scope of the 
subject by defining the field of research and the model of ethics that will be applied in this 
reflection. 
 
1.4- Field of Research and Methodology 
 
A study of human dignity and borders involves many fields and academic disciplines. 
However, I will ground my research in social ethics. From this perspective, many academic 
disciplines such as exegesis, politics, law, anthropology, etc., will be considered since the 
issue of ―dignity across borders‖ crosses many fields. This research will be grounded in the 
tension between two ethical models, Christian realism and cosmopolitan ethics. While 
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Christian realism
30
 can provide an intellectual framework for approaching refugee issues by 
taking into account the ―real-world‖ at the local level, cosmopolitan ethics31 will provide a 
horizon or a telos and an ideal to the same ―real-world‖ at the global level, especially when 
dealing with refugee issues in a highly politicized world. The ethical principle of 
subsidiarity will help to combine harmoniously the local level shaped by the realist model, 
and the global level shaped by the cosmopolitan model. 
 
1.5- Purpose of Research and Principal Argument 
 
The fundamental question that guides this research is: How may we best rethink the 
relation between borders and refugee issues in order to protect the dignity of refugees and 
                                               
30 Christian realism, as developed by Reinhold Niebuhr and Eric Patterson, aims at understanding and 
involvement in politics based on a realistic standpoint. Christian realism takes into account the sinful nature of 
individuals and communities in political responsibility in search of the common good. As Eric Patterson wrote, 
―Christian realism articulates a conception of political responsibility for action to engage evil, recogn izes the 
ubiquity of power politics in world affairs, and suggests pragmatic solutions for matching power with power in 
order to find proximate solutions to the issues of competition and struggle in social relations.‖ (Eric Patterson, 
editor, Christianity and Power Politics Today: Christian Realism and Contemporary Political Dilemmas (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 180). 
31 I will particularly refer to Kwame Appiah‘s version of cosmopolitanism. See K.A. Appiah, 
Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006). 
This version of cosmopolitanism emphasizes three points that are important for ethics in international affairs: 
Human dignity, universality and differences, universal responsibility. As Appiah states: ―[Cosmopolitans] 
believe in human dignity across the nations, and they live their creed.‖ (Ibid., 137). In that way, 
cosmopolitanism gives many opportunities to protect human beings everywhere in the world, because human 
dignity is considered as being the fundamental and the highest value in national and international politics. 
Cosmopolitanism claims that all people are bound together by their humanity and by common values. These 
common values are not inferred by a kind of positivist deduction, but they emerge from interaction between 
different people. Moreover, in Appiah‘s perspective, cosmopolitanism is a kind of a universal trait of 
humankind in a world of strangers. This implies a universal responsibility. As Appiah states: ―Each person you 
know about and can affect, is someone to whom you have responsibilities: to say this is just to affirm the very 
idea of morality.‖ (Ibid., xiii). In brief, cosmopolitan ethics is more adequate to address international and 
global issues. It is therefore relevant for the refugee issues which scope always crosses national borders. 
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IDPs who always have to cross borders? My answer (thesis) to the above question is that 
the importance of the dignity of refugees and IDPs should be considered prior to borders. 
And the purpose of geographic and non-geographic borders is to protect persons and their 
dignity. Therefore, any policy that concerns refugees and IDPs should deal with this issue 
not only as a technical issue, that is, not only as political, humanitarian, or economic issues, 
but always as a human issue where human dignity is at stake. I will develop my argument in 
the next three chapters. 
 
1.6- Plan of the thesis 
 
 After having defined the purpose and the scope of this reflection in this first chapter, 
the thesis will proceed as follow: 
The second chapter will focus on the political context that shapes refugee and IDP 
issues in the contemporary world. The second chapter will try to answer these questions: 
How can one preserve the dignity of refugees and IDPs within national borders? And why is 
state sovereignty so important in refugees and IDPs issues? I will make an attempt to show 
how the Westphalian model of state and its role within its borders shape the question of 
refugees and IDPs today. This explains the fact that the actual international refugee regime 
operates within a highly politicized context, one in which governments are more likely to 
support assistance programs for security and foreign policy reasons than only for 
humanitarian concern. In such a context, the refugees and IDPs problem becomes essentially 
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political; and borders control becomes an issue of state sovereignty. In this situation, states 
deal with refugee and IDP issue not always as an issue that implies the dignity of refugees 
and IDPs, but often as an issue where the sovereignty and the security of the state are at 
stake. While challenging the heritage of understanding state‘s borders and the role of states 
within and beyond their borders, I will stress the fact that the contemporary world is more 
and more globalized so that it no longer fits perfectly with the model of the Westphalian 
world. The world is more and more interconnected, and borders do not play the same role as 
they do in a Westphalian model of the state. Yet, in the Post-Westphalian world, borders are 
still important. However, states are less and less the only masters within their borders. And 
the emergence of a non-sate-based international community guided by a common ideal and 
rules – which includes human rights appeals to us to rethink state‘s borders and to balance 
state sovereignty with individual sovereignty. From this perspective, the second chapter will 
explore ways and means to rethink the international refugee protection regime so that it may 
be more effective in insuring protection to refugees and IDPs. 
 
The third chapter presents an opportunity to use Christian ethical and biblical 
resources in the public debate on refugees and IDP issues. It will focus on a biblical 
understanding of refugee and IDP issues in relation to the problem of crossing borders. The 
aim of the chapter will be to find how the experience of Israel‘s exile and the teachings and 
the life of Jesus can inspire ways of liberating the surrendered dignity of refugees and IDPs. 
The biblical analysis will seek to understand how Israel‘s experience of exile had informed 
the First Testament teachings on refugees and the understanding of national borders. The 
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argument will be that, because the people of Israel had been refugees in exile and had been 
saved by God, therefore Israel should take care of the stranger and the refugee. Israel‘s 
relation to the land is also informed by its experience of having been a refugee. The land is 
still the land of the Lord, so that Israel is not free within its territorial borders to do 
everything it wants, especially when lives of foreigners and refugees are at stake. This 
chapter will also show how Israel‘s experience of exile is still relevant to the Second 
Testament‘s teachings. It will show how Jesus had crossed many borders, geographic and 
non-geographic borders. He had been a refugee in Egypt. What insights can we draw from 
this biblical experience of refugees in the two Testaments? The answer to this question will 
force me to rethink the refugee regime from the perspective of the Christian ethical principle 
of the universal common good. I will look for a way to hold together the universal common 
good and the particular good of individual nation-states from the perspective of refugees and 
IDPs protection. I will try to show how Christian social teachings deal with refugees always 
in relation to the reality of the human family.  
 
The fourth chapter will focus on advocacy for refugees and IDPs. Advocacy is a 
very complex process. As Paul Cambridge and Lucy Williams wrote, 
Advocacy is characterized by diverse paradigms of support and intervention, associated with 
a range of approaches and by sometimes contradictory or conflicting principles, such as 
protection and empowerment or control and autonomy.32 
                                               
32 Paul Cambridge and Lucy Williams, ―Approaches to Advocacy for Refugees and Asylum Seekers: a 
Development Case Study for a Local Support and Advice Service,‖ Journal of Refugee Studies 17, no.1 
(2004): 97-98. 
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In this chapter, first, I will focus on three basic approaches, the welfarist approach, the 
legalistic approach, and the capability approach (Amartya Sen). From the assessment of 
these above approaches I will suggest the recognition approach (Paul Ricoeur). This latter 
approach is grounded on the principle of human dignity which offers a cosmopolitan 
understanding of rights and duties. 
 
Finally, the fifth chapter (general conclusion) will summarize the main conclusions 
of the entire thesis on dignity across borders. It will stress the main ideas and actions to 
ensure a better protection to refugees and IDPs who should be considered as dignities who 
cross borders. 
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CHAPTER 2: STATE SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN BORDERS AND THE PROTECTION OF 
REFUGEES AND IDPS 
 
2.0- Introduction 
 
Refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) crises usually emerge from states that 
failed in their duties of ensuring the well-being of their citizens. At the same time, these 
states rely on the principle of sovereignty, which does not allow for any intervention in the 
internal affairs of a state in order to end crises which result in IDPs and refugees plights. 
Host countries rely also on this principle of sovereignty to determine the number of asylum-
seekers to whom they will provide legal protection. That is why, from the perspective both 
of the sending countries and of the host countries, politics matters a great deal in providing 
protection for IDPs and for refugees. And state sovereignty becomes a stumbling block that 
one should consider in addressing IDPs and refugees issues.  
 
However, there is nowadays an erosion of sovereignty in favor of human rights 
protection. The contemporary world is in a transitional stage where the Westphalian 
understanding of state sovereignty within its borders coexists with a new global order that is 
moving the world toward a cosmopolitan society where state sovereignty is understood as 
responsibility and accountability. In accord with this transitional phase of the contemporary 
world, this chapter will, first, address refugees and IDPs protection from the Westphalian 
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heritage of understanding state sovereignty. This analysis will reveal that even if the 
international legal regime of refugee protection is under state dominion, practices of 
protection extend beyond existing international laws on refugees. Second, this chapter will 
try to rethink refugees and IDPs protection by taking into consideration changes that move 
the world politics from a Westphalian framework to a global and cosmopolitan framework. 
The third part will show how this new framework induces for states and for non-state actors 
some duties beyond national borders for finding solutions to refugees and IDPs crises.  
 
The argument of this chapter is that the situation of refugees and IDPs can be 
improved, and especially that states should do better than they are doing now. Instead of 
arguing for the free movement of refugees in a world without borders, I will, rather, argue 
for an embodiment of sovereignty as responsibility and accountability for refugees and IDPs 
protection. In other terms, I will rethink refugees and IDPs protection from a human rights-
based perspective. 
 
2.1- Westphalian concept of sovereignty and the protection of 
refugees and IDPs 
 
I will portray the political world in which the drama of IDPs and refugees takes place. 
Then, I will present how this context affects the international legal system of refugee 
protection, and how practices of protection exceed beyond the international legal system. 
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2.1.1- A political analysis of the world-context of IDPs and refugees 
 
The contemporary model of states has its roots in the settlement of Westphalia in 
1648.
33
 This settlement ended the Thirty Years‘ War in Europe, and opened the way for the 
creation of independent states, which enjoy sovereignty to pursue their interests without 
destroying each other or the international system of which each is a part.
34
 In the 
Westphalian model of state, territorial borders are very important and they are part of the 
definition of the state. There is no state without borders. Borders are marks of a state‘s 
sovereignty within its territory. States have the duty to ensure security and to organize the 
community within their borders. Borders are also a delimitation of state sovereignty in 
international relations. From this perspective, the state is understood as a territorial 
authority, which is considered to be supreme in jurisdictional terms. As Alan James 
explains, 
A sovereign state… appears to have a free hand with regard to its internal lawmaking (as 
well as to the development of its legal relations with other states). Seemingly, it can, in 
principle, do what it likes, for it is not subject to any superior authority. It can tell other states 
and international bodies to keep their noses out of its affairs. This is the condition which is 
frequently regarded as justifying the use of the term ‗sovereignty‘ to describe the regular 
territorial actors on the international stage. The usage is meant to reflect the fact that they 
enjoy jurisdictional independence.35 
 
                                               
33 Making Westphalia the starting point of state sovereignty is conventional. As Philpott wrote: ―Elements of 
sovereign statehood had been accumulating for three centuries, making Westphalia the consolidation, not the 
creation ex nihilo, of the modern system.‖ (Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped 
Modern International Relations (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 77). 
34 Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 5. 
35 Alan James, ―States and Sovereignty,‖ in Issues in International Relations, edited by Trevor C. Salmon 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 7. 
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Therefore, the international system was built on the idea that states were the principal 
actors, and their sovereignty was considered absolute. In this way, all states were legally 
equal, even though in fact they were not. With this follows the decentralization of the system 
of international relations. According to Lyons and Mastanduno, the stability of this 
decentralized system was based on these elements: 
A balance of power to prevent the rise of preponderant states and to contain unlimited 
aggression; the codification of rules of behavior through international law; the convening of 
international conferences to settle major differences; and the growth of diplomatic practices 
through which states would maintain continuing contact and be encouraged to negotiate 
differences among themselves. With the emergence of these institutions [and principles], the 
system of states was transformed into an international ―society‖, in which members were 
sovereign yet recognized commonly accepted norms, rules, and obligations.36 
 
These commonly accepted norms and institutions aim to avoid the reign of anarchy 
and to promote a well-ordered and peaceful international society based on states. However, 
states do not surrender their sovereignty by adherence to international norms and institutions 
like the United Nations Organization (UN) or the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). Even with such adherence, each state continues to determine the nature 
of its relations with other states, and each state is expected to take into consideration the 
standards of the international state-based community. These norms are only an expectation, 
a recommendation. That is why Joseph S. Nye insists upon understanding ―international 
politics as politics in the absence of a common sovereign, politics among entities with no 
                                               
36 Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 6. 
28 
 
ruler above them.‖37 Even the UN acknowledges this when its charter affirms: ―The 
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.‖38 This 
equality seems to be more an ideal than a reality because of the lack of genuine equality 
between nations, due to the dominance of superpowers over the rest of the world.  
 
However, while state borders and sovereignty, which are the main features of the 
Westphalian world, are still relevant today, we have to take into account some recent 
developments of contemporary international relations which do not fit the Westphalian 
framework. In fact, nowadays, non-state actors, especially international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs), are significant components of the international system and have 
participated in the international realm to a greater or lesser extent throughout western 
history. These constitute the so-called ―international civil society‖ in relation to the 
international state-based community. Their recent growth is, in part, a response to increased 
interconnectedness among peoples.
39
 These INGOs intervene in many issues such as 
refugees, peace building, etc. The increasing role of non-state actors reflects the shift from 
legal interrelationships among states to a broader, more inclusive, view of non-state 
participants. 
 
                                               
37 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History (New York & 
Boston: Pearson Longman, 2005), 3. 
38 See United Nations Organization‘s Charter, article 2. 
39 This phenomenon has been much discussed in sociological literature. See e.g., Anthony Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press; and Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
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This interdependence expresses that sovereign nation-states have common interests. 
They can no longer pursue their domestic interests without cooperating with others. 
Interdependence between states and non-state actors does not concern poor or weak states 
alone. Even superpowers can no longer claim to have complete sovereignty. One example of 
interdependence is that security is no longer only a domestic affair. We can see how 
refugees from Rwanda are a source of insecurity and war in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.   
 
Despite the existence of numerous international institutions and norms which 
undermine nation-state sovereignty by changing significantly the ways states govern and 
implement their sovereignty,
40
 the state is still essential to the international system. And 
despite the fact that the international community has become an overlapping interconnection 
between nation-state actors, and between non-state actors, and between peoples across 
national borders, the state remains the most important actor in international politics and in 
the international community. It is in such an international community that IDPs and refugee 
issues should be understood. This political world constitutes the background on which I will 
analyze the international refugee protection regime.  
 
                                               
40 For example from the perspective of the United Nations‘ Charter, state sovereignty involves obligations as 
well as rights. See Article 2. 
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2.1.2- The international system of refugees and IDPs protection  
 
The international system of refugees and IDPs protection is a by-product of the 
political world that I have tried to depict in the section above. From this perspective of a 
political world shaped by states, the protection of refugees and IDPs depends largely on 
states. This explains the fact that the actual international refugee regime operates within a 
highly politicized context in which governments are more likely to support assistance 
programs for reasons of security and foreign policy than for primarily humanitarian 
concerns.
41
 Therefore, the problem of refugees and IDPs becomes essentially political; and 
border control becomes an issue of state sovereignty. In this situation, states often deal with 
refugees and IDPs not always as an issue that implies the dignity of refugees and IDPs, but 
only as an issue where the sovereignty and the security of the state are involved. I will 
analyze the international refugee protection regime by explaining how the refugee is a 
political concept; and by describing the international legal definitions of the refugee as a 
political process that limits protection to only a small number of refugees. Through this 
analysis, I intend to provide a critical understanding of the refugee protection regime and to 
make some suggestions for its improvement. 
 
2.1.2.1-The refugee as a political concept 
 
The refugee is a political concept even if the reality to which it refers is more complex. 
                                               
41 Gil Loscher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30. 
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The refugee can evoke a humanitarian issue, or a moral issue, or a development issue, and so 
forth. However, the contemporary concept of the refugee is related to the notion of national 
boundaries and state sovereignty. I agree with Ferris when she remarks perceptively that  
If there were no nation-state system, if we lived in a world without borders, there would be 
no refugees, no migrants, and no reason to develop laws or procedures for dealing with them. 
While often couched in humanitarian – even moral – rhetoric, decisions about how to deal 
with refugees and the whole international system for dealing with the movement of people is 
based on the explicit recognition that it is the responsibility of states, and states alone, to 
determine who can enter their territory.42 
 
In fact, the refugee is a person who has crossed national borders, and who, unlike 
other migrants, has been forced to leave his/her country
43
. But to be recognized as a refugee, 
it is not enough to cross national borders because one has been forced to do so. It is only the 
state that can recognize a person as a refugee. Thus the issue of refugees not only has a 
political dimension; but more than that, it is primarily a political issue
44
 which involves 
many other considerations. This explains why politics shapes the legal definitions of the 
refugee. 
 
                                               
42 Elizabeth G. Ferris, Beyond Borders: Refugees, Migrants and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 
(Geneva: WCC Publications, 1993), 3. 
43 I will develop this definition when I address the legal definition of the refugee. 
44 That is why I agree with Gerald Dirks who states that ―Sovereign and nationalism are essential precursors of 
the modern refugee phenomenon‖. See Gerald Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism? 
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1977), 2. Gerald Dirks has been quoted by Elizabeth G. Ferris in 
Refugees and World Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), 2. 
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2.1.2.2- Problems with International legal definitions of refugees 
 
Before analyzing legal definitions of who is a refugee, we must keep in mind that the 
crucial question is not how international norms define refugees, but why they define them 
the way they do.
45
 I suggest understanding the international norms about refugees as aiming 
not to define who a refugee is but to determine the ones whom the states choose to protect. 
That is why politics matters so much in the legal definition of a refugee.  
 
That said, three official legal definitions of a refugee are most commonly cited; the 
first one from the 1951 Refugee Convention aims to be universal; and the two others are 
definitions from regional organizations, namely the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
and the countries of Latin America. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
is the key legal document in defining who a refugee is, their rights, and the legal obligations 
of states.
46
 It defines a refugee as someone who 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.47 
 
                                               
45 See Satvinder Singh Juss, International Migration and Global Justice (London: Ashgate, 2006), 198. 
46 This Convention had been completed by the 1967 Protocol which removed geographical and temporal euro-
centric restrictions so that the Convention can be applied as a universal treaty. 
47 See the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 1, A 2. 
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A careful assessment of this definition reveals that the 1951 Refugee Convention takes 
into consideration only political and civil rights. Basically, from this perspective, refugees 
are individual victims fleeing from persecution by governments. Therefore, the Convention 
excludes persons who flee from generalized conditions of violence, insecurity, oppression, 
or the economic impoverishment of ―failed states‖. This raises questions, as Antonio 
Guterres wrote: ―When, for example, a country such as Zimbabwe began to implode, how 
were the millions of Zimbabweans crossing the border into South Africa in search of a 
semblance of decent life to be qualified?‖48 Moreover, the Convention does not consider as 
refugees those who are internally displaced because of war or persecution and who have not 
left their country of origin.
49
 There are many other new categories of people who resemble 
refugees but who are not taken into account by the Convention.
50
 However, the OAU 
Refugee Convention and the Cartagena Declaration have tried to broaden the definition of a 
refugee. 
 
The OAU Refugee Convention
51
 includes in its definition of refugee 
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order, in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
                                               
48 António Guterres, ―Millions Uprooted Saving Refugees and the Displaced,‖ Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 
(September/October 2008).  
49 I will address the question of the protection of internally displaced people later in the section ―Responsibility 
to protect‖. 
50 For more analysis on new categories of people who can be considered as refugees, see António Guterres, 
―Millions Uprooted Saving Refugees and the Displaced,‖ Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 (September/October 2008). 
Or see Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity, 5-7. 
51 The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in Africa usually called the AUO 
Refugee Convention has been adopted on September 10th 1969 at Addis Ababa. It came into force on June 20th 
1974. 
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nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his origin or nationality.52 
This definition extends protection to all forced transnational migrants who cross borders 
because of man-made disasters.
53
 This definition also gives room for the legal protection of 
IDPs. By the same token, the Cartagena Declaration
54
 gives a more extensive definition that 
includes persons who flee their countries ―because their lives, safety or freedom have been 
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation 
of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order‖.   
 
All these international legal instruments widened their definitions of who is a refugee 
in order to extend protection to many people who are not taken into account by the 1951 
Refugee Convention. While almost all experts in refugee issues agree on the inadequacy of 
the official legal definitions of a refugee, they are divided on the matter of whether to widen 
these definitions. I agree with Antonio Guterres that  
The idea that we could enlarge the concept of refugees, diluting the level of protection 
granted to them is, in my opinion, a real danger. I would prefer therefore not to touch the 
1951 Convention. But one needs to determine then how the international community can 
cope with the problems of protection of people who move for interlinked reasons, factors 
beyond those that prompt normal migration.55 
 
                                               
52 The AUO Refugee Convention, Article 1(2). 
53 See Satvinder Singh Juss, International Migration and Global Justice (London: Ashgate, 2006), 193. 
54 See Article III (3) of the Cartagena Declaration adopted in a colloquium of Latin American leaders in 1984. 
55 António Guterres, ―People on the Move: The Challenges of Displacement in the 21st Century,‖ IRC-UK 
Annual Lecture, Royal Geographical Society, London, 16 June 2008; available from: 
http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/48873def4.html. Accessed on May 1st, 2009. 
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There is indeed a problem in the legal concept of a refugee. However, the lack of an 
adequate definition is not a sufficient reason for hindering refugee protection. In fact, in 
addition to these legal instruments, the framework of international law and standards about 
refugee protection includes the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 
Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law, as well as an array of international 
and regional treaties and declarations, both binding and nonbinding, that specifically address 
the needs of refugees. Therefore, the issue is now primarily how to persuade the 
international community to take advantage of all these legal instruments to protect refugees 
efficiently. In other words, as Juss asks, ―Why do so given a state-based international system 
with the sovereign right to exclude?‖56  
 
My argument is that we can have the best legal definition of a refugee, but if we do not 
re-conceptualize the central role of national sovereignty, the protection of refugees will not 
significantly be improved. The fact is that even if the international laws prescribe that some 
people who resemble refugees should be allowed to enter the territory of other states, and 
even if NGOs and UN agencies can press governments for the sake of such people, 
ultimately, the national government decides who will be allowed to cross its borders and to 
enjoy protection. Despite international laws and standards, most of the states prescribe their 
own rules and procedures for obtaining refugee status, the bearers of which the state 
                                               
56 Satvinder Singh Juss, International Migration and Global Justice, 200. 
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commits to protection as refugees. Yet, the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status states that 
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfills the 
criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which 
his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore 
make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of 
recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.57 
 
Therefore, being a refugee and being legally recognized as one are two very different 
things. From the perspective of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it can happen that someone is 
a refugee, but at the same time he/she may not be recognized as a refugee by the receiving 
state. That is why the granting of refugee status is more a political act of the state than a 
legal act. In sum, the issue of refugees is, above all, a political issue even if its solution 
should not be limited to the political level. From this perspective, many organizations that 
work for refugees have understood that the means for achieving refugee protection are more 
diplomatic and political rather than legal and juridical. How do they address concretely this 
issue of refugees? 
 
2.1.3- Practices of protection beyond the international laws on refugees 
 
In order to solve the problem of restrictive legal definitions of refugee, many 
governmental and non-governmental actors usually offer a broad interpretation of the 
                                               
57 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, no. 28. 
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international laws on refugees. For example, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) states in its 
Charter that 
The mission given to JRS embraces all persons who are driven from their homes by conflict, 
humanitarian disaster or violation of human rights, following Catholic social teaching which 
applies the expression de facto refugee to many related categories of people.58  
 
Like JRS, many other organizations and especially NGOs are not bound by the 
internationally accepted definition of a refugee from the 1951 Refugee Convention. They 
use a broadened definition of refugee in order to provide relief to a large category of people 
who are like refugees, but who do not meet the formal criteria of international conventions. 
This is the case of internally displaced people who can benefit from a broader application of 
the legal concept of refugee. This a good way to deal with refugee issues within the 
restrictive legal framework. Yet, there are many criticisms against these practices that 
extend relief to large groups of people who resemble refugees. These criticisms are relevant 
especially when it appears that some people who take advantage of NGOs and Church-
sponsored relief services are combatants, drug dealers, and so forth. As Ferris justifies, these 
cases weaken the credibility of churches and NGOs.
59
 However, according to the ethical 
principle of the lesser evil, it is better occasionally to make mistakes by acting in a way that 
is too inclusive than in a way that is too restrictive, because human lives are at stake. 
 
                                               
58 See The JRS Charter, no. 8, in Jesuit Refugee Service, Everybody’s Challenge: Essential Documents of 
Jesuit Refugee Service. 1980-2000 (Rome: Jesuit Refugee Service, 2000), 15. 
59 Elizabeth G. Ferris, Beyond Borders: Refugees, Migrants and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 21. 
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In the same way, it is important to note that the UNHCR itself is involved with many 
categories of people who do not meet the formal criteria of refugee according to the 1951 
Refugee Convention. In fact, the UNCHR annual Global Trends report, which reviews the 
statistical trends and changes in the global populations for whom UNHCR has been 
entrusted with a responsibility by the United Nations General Assembly, includes at least 
five categories of people, that is, refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees, stateless persons and 
certain groups of IDPs. The UNHCR names collectively these categories as ―persons of 
concern‖60. Regarding the protection of IDPs in particular, the UN61 has developed a legal 
framework known as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
62
 However, these 
principles do not have the force of a treaty; they are not binding upon states. That is why 
Roberta Cohen suggests a UN reform that must build on this trend, ―and address the tensions 
that exist between an emerging international responsibility to protect IDPs and more 
traditional notions of sovereignty that often obstruct humanitarian action.‖63 In sum, even 
though the international legal framework for refugees is very narrow, in practice, inter-
governmental actors and numerous NGOs use a broad definition of refugees in order to 
protect large groups of people who are refugees, whether by legal status or in reality. 
 
                                               
60 See UNHCR, 2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless 
Persons (June 2008), 2. 
61 The legal framework was introduced into the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998 by Francis M. 
Deng, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. 
62 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN 
Doc.E /CN.4/1998/53/ Add.2, 1998). 
63 Roberta Cohen, “Strengthening Protection of IDPs: The UN‘s Role,‖ Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs (Winter/Spring 2006): 108. 
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Since the practices of refugee protection are already beyond the international legal 
framework, why do not rethink the refugee protection regime from the bottom up? In other 
words, why does not the international legal framework of refugee protection acknowledge 
the ongoing practices by updating the laws related to refugees? Perhaps the best question to 
ask is not why, but how and to what extent the refugee laws can take into account changes 
and practices that move the international community beyond a Westphalian framework. My 
argument is that we should move out of the Westphalian understanding of the state‘s 
sovereignty and focus instead on the international community. As long as the Westphalian 
framework continues to shape the world, there will be no fundamental progress in refugee 
protection. I agree with António Guterres who believes ―that if the 1951 Convention were 
drafted today, it would not be as strong as the one drafted after the Second World War.‖64 
The reason is that, today, states are more jealous of their sovereignty. States are more 
concerned about their sovereignty because their sovereignty is now more than ever contested 
by some features of the globalizing world. In this situation, I suggest that instead of rescuing 
state sovereignty, we have to rethink it by taking into account the trends of the globalizing 
and more cosmopolitan world. What does this mean, and what are the likely implications for 
the refugee protection regime? 
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2.2-Rethinking the refugee protection regime in a globalizing world 
 
The globalizing world and the emerging international human rights regime appeal for 
a new refugee protection regime where nation-states and non-state actors are all committed. 
 
2.2.1- The globalizing world and the challenge to national borders: No “migration 
without borders” 
 
The contemporary world is more and more interconnected, and borders no longer play 
the same role they did in the Westphalian state. Borders are still important. However, states 
are less and less the sole masters within their borders. In developed countries as well as in 
developing ones, the state has participated in constructing a global economic system and 
furthering a consensus to pursue this objective. This participation has affected the power of 
different agencies within the state and advanced the internationalization of the interstate 
system.
65
 It is beyond doubt that in the contemporary globally interdependent world where 
ever more citizens pursue their happiness by consuming foreign goods and services or 
travelling abroad, nation-states can no longer realize many of their objectives in a kind of 
autarchy independent from other nation-states. However, as Sassen states,  
There is a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls for the flow 
of capital, information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization. But when it 
comes to immigrants and refugees, whether in North America, Western Europe, or Japan, the 
                                               
65 See Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 12. 
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national state claims all its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders. 
On this matter there is also a consensus in the community of states.66  
 
In other words, the community of states permits the importation of commodities but 
closes the borders to immigrants and refugees. In order to address this problem, some 
analysts suggest ―the migration without borders scenario.‖67 My argument is that this seems 
not to be an adequate solution. Yet, certain moral principles such as the unity of humankind 
(human family), and the universal common good, can justify a world without borders. From 
this perspective, there will be no refugees, since the notion of refugee presumes national 
borders. But, such an approach can cause more difficulties, because removing borders can 
mean removing responsibilities. There is no world government or no world authority that 
can ensure effectively the responsibility to protect forced migrants like refugees. Even the 
UNHCR relies on local governments to provide protection to refugees. That is why the 
ethical principle of subsidiarity is essential to achieving harmony as the local level is shaped 
by the states, and the global level is shaped by international organizations. State boundaries 
are indispensable. Instead of arguing for a world without borders,
68
 we must rather argue for 
an interpretation of national borders as an assignment of responsibility. 
 
                                               
66 Ibid., 1. 
67 See Antoine Pecoud and Paul de Guchteneire, editors, Migration without Borders: Essay on the Free 
Movement of People (Paris: UNESCO Publishing; New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007). 
68 See Thuy Do and others, eds., Refugees and the myth of the borderless world (Canberra: National Library of 
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Moreover, I will argue that the emergence of a non-state-based international 
community guided by a common ideal and rules including respect for human rights, 
promises to balance state sovereignty with individual sovereignty. Thus, in the globalizing 
world, although the state continues to play the most important role in refugee policy making 
and implementing, it is no longer sufficient simply to examine its formal role in this arena. It 
is also necessary to examine the transformation of both the state itself and the interstate 
system and what these changes mean for refugee protection. 
 
2.2.2- Human rights and Individual sovereignty as a counterbalance to state 
sovereignty 
 
One of the most important features of the globalizing world that is relevant to a new 
understanding of the refugee protection regime is the emergence of the international human 
rights regime. In fact, the much older Westphalian system of international law is aimed at 
protecting international order rather than human rights and justice.
69
 But with the universal 
recognition of human rights and of supranational organizations, the Westphalian paradigm 
has become more and more inadequate and obsolete. In international law, this shift from 
maintaining order to protecting human rights is expressed by the emergence of the norms of 
jus cogens and the obligations of erga omnes. While jus cogens designs norms from which 
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no derogation is permitted, erga omnes designs obligations binding on all states without 
exception, with every state having an interest in their protection.
70
 These two legal 
instruments are used in the human rights regime and they limit expressly the power of state 
sovereignty to renounce human rights treaties. 
 
It is important to notice that human rights are not dependent on nationality, unlike 
political, social, and civil rights, which are predicated on the distinction between national 
and alien. Human rights override such distinctions and for this reason can be seen as 
potentially challenging state sovereignty.
71
 That is why international human rights, while 
partly rooted in the founding documents of certain nation-states, are today a force that can 
undermine the exclusive authority of the state over its nationals and thereby contribute to 
transforming the interstate system, the international legal order, and especially the 
international refugee protection regime.  
 
From the perspective of the international human rights regime, membership in 
territorially exclusive nation-states ceases to be the only ground for the realization of rights. 
All residents, whether citizens or not, can claim their human rights. Thus, human rights 
begin to affect the principle of nation-based citizenship and the boundaries of the nation.
72
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From such a human rights perspective, the international legal system must serve human 
rights and democratic self-government as the proper bases of sovereignty. In our 
contemporary world, human rights can erode the legitimacy of the state if states fail to 
respect such human rights. This is the case of Sudan faced with the mass-violation of human 
rights in Darfur. It is no longer merely a question of self-determination but of respect for 
international human rights. Asylum-seekers and IDPs whose legal status is not yet 
recognized can therefore claim their rights to be treated as human beings with respect to 
their dignity. The growing ability of NGOs and individuals to make claims on the basis of 
international human rights instruments has implications beyond the boundaries of individual 
states. It affects the configuration of the international order. At the same time, it shows a 
progress that goes beyond the expansion of human rights within the framework of nation-
states. It contributes to a redefinition of the bases of the legitimacy of states under the rule of 
law and the notion of nationality and national borders. As Sassen explains, in this process,  
The concept of nationality is being partly displaced from a principle that reinforces state 
sovereignty and self-determination (through the state‘s right/power to define its nationals) to 
a concept emphasizing that the state is accountable to all its residents on the basis of 
international human rights law. The individual emerges as the object of international law and 
institutions.73 
From this, one can appeal for a new basis for the refugee protection regime that can take into 
account the international human rights laws and also non-state actors who are involved in 
refugee protection. Let us develop these two points. 
 
2.2.3- The Shift in refugee protection from the traditional international law 
perspective to a human rights perspective 
 
I have already explained how the international legal definitions of refugee status are 
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political definitions,
74
 and how states use these politicized definitions to limit mass refugee 
flow by granting refugee status to only a few people.
75
 I have also explained how it is risky 
today to modify these international legal definitions of refugee status. For all these reasons, 
it will be more effective to ground refugee protection in the international human rights 
regime. Even though the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not as binding as a 
treaty or a convention, it represents a kind of moral standard for the international 
community, so much so that there is nowadays a growing accountability of states to 
international human rights. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights inspired 
many international
76
 and regional
77
 legal instruments that are binding for states. Certain 
analysts such as David Hollenbach construe human rights not only as moral norms, but also 
in a more compulsory way as legal norms: 
Human rights are moral as well as legal norms, and … when existing legal standards fail to 
serve the human dignity of displaced persons [and refugees], the law should be changed and 
developed in light of ethical requirements of human treatment.78 
 
The human rights approach to refugee protection provides the advantage of addressing 
the refugee issue on both fronts, that of the sending and of the receiving countries. The 
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sending government can be held accountable for violations of human rights which usually 
constitute the main reason for refugee flows. Similarly, the receiving government can be 
held accountable for guaranteeing a better treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers on the 
ground of human rights. As Ferris argues: 
With a human-rights approach, researchers and activists look beyond the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees in arguing that uprooted people have needs which are 
greater than UNHCR is able to meet. Rather, agencies such as the UN Commission on 
Human Rights must become involved in examining the human-rights components of 
displaced people and in assuring protection in situations where UNHCR has no such 
mandate.79 
 
In sum, from an exclusive emphasis on the sovereignty of the people and on the state‘s 
right to self-determination, a shift of focus towards the rights of individuals regardless of 
nationality has occurred in the contemporary world. It remains uncertain whether the 
international human rights instruments which privilege individual rights will be universally 
implemented. However, the emerging international human rights regime offers far stronger 
grounds and better possibilities for refugee protection than the traditional international laws 
informed by state sovereignty and self-determination. This also opens the way for non-state 
actors to be involved legitimately in finding solutions for the plight of refugees. 
 
2.2.4- Providing protection: interconnected efforts of states and non-state actors 
 
Because of the process of globalization, the international community appears more 
and more as overlapping interconnections between nation-states and non-state actors, and 
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between people across national borders. And because of the fact that individuals and non-
state actors can make claims on states based on human rights, refugee protection should not 
be entrusted only to states or to intergovernmental organizations like the UNHCR. All 
actors, states as well as NGOs and individuals, should be allowed to play important roles. 
There are already many NGOs who are working with refugees; however there is little 
coordination between them, as is evident in their annual reports.  
 
A promising next step might be to create a space for dialogue where all actors 
involved in a specific refugee crisis could build a common view or at least a minimum 
defining the protection of refugees in a particular situation. In fact, as it stands now, states 
and non-state actors can hold contradictory views of refugee protection. For example, Gil 
Loescher showed how,  
humanitarianism has been adopted by states as a political tool… The practice of using refugees 
to serve strategic or military objectives has been used widely by small and big powers and 
even by refugee warrior groups.80 
 
In the same way, NGOs are not prevented from such a distortion. That is why a 
dialogue between actors can help to improve refugee protection. Of course, because of the 
diversity of actors, it will not be a single view or a single way of providing relief and 
protection. However, on the basis of human rights, it is possible through discussion to reach 
an agreement. From this perspective, refugee protection will appear as a kind of net effect of 
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many overlapping efforts by NGOs and states on the willingness to cooperate with and assist 
refugees in endeavors for the good of a particular group of refugees and for the common 
good for all, for host countries as well as for sending countries. Moreover, a dialogue 
between diverse actors in resolving a refugee crisis in a particular place is more likely to be 
an important force of persuasion. As B.S. Chimni remarks rightfully,  
While publications such as the World Refugee Survey are playing an important role … it is 
the product of the efforts of a single NGO. In our view, a more collective effort would give 
the proposed report greater authority and circulation. The collective production of an annual 
Refugee Watch would persuade States to enter into dialogue with the transnational NGO 
network.81 
 
In sum, the contemporary world is built on the heritage of Westphalia. However, many 
changes are moving it to a kind of post-Westphalian world where international relations are 
making a shift from a state sovereignty-based world to a human rights-based world. States 
will have to share the stage with actors whose actions go beyond geographical boundaries. 
More fundamentally, they will have to envision sovereignty and self-determination in 
conformity with the standards of human rights. That is why states have duties within and 
beyond their borders. This opens avenues especially for IDPs protection. 
 
2.3-Duties within and beyond national borders 
 
This section will present how sovereignty understood as responsibility implies duties 
within and beyond national borders to protect refugees and especially IDPs.  
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2.3.1- Sovereignty reconceptualized as responsibility 
 
International law still protects sovereignty and has in the state its main object. No 
simple way are the days of the sovereign state coming to an end
82
. However, the universal 
recognition of inalienable human rights requires interpreting state sovereignty and individual 
sovereignty in a mutually coherent manner so as to protect more effectively human dignity 
and other principles of justice across borders. From this perspective, sovereignty should be 
conceived not in legal terms as in Westphalian framework, but in a very concrete and 
objective way, both from a political and ethical perspective.  
 
That is, from a political perspective, a state should be considered to enjoy sovereignty 
to the extent to which it can successfully look after itself, and can follow its own 
independent course in the international community. In other terms, a state that is effectively 
in command of its internal and external destiny, and which can assert a high measure of 
political independence, is likely to be substantially sovereign even if engaged in an 
interdependent relationship with others. On the other hand, a state which is less successful in 
this regard will be considered as less sovereign.  
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From an ethical perspective, a state should be considered sovereign to the extent to 
which it can provide an authority accountable for the well-being of a designated citizenry
83
 
in solidarity with the rest of the world. That is why Francis Deng argues that state 
sovereignty should be understood as responsibility within and beyond national borders: 
The sovereign state‘s responsibility and accountability to both domestic and external 
constituencies must be affirmed as interconnected principles of national and international 
order. Such a normative code is anchored in the assumption that in order to be legitimate, 
sovereignty must demonstrate responsibility. At the very least that means providing for the 
basic needs of its people.84 
 
Sovereignty, therefore, refers less to a state‘s self-determination than to its ability to 
carry out its functions of government in coherence with human rights. The respect for 
human rights calls for states‘ accountability for upholding standards of human rights and 
responsibility for their implementation. Accountability and responsibility justify duties 
beyond borders
85
 such as humanitarian intervention
86
 in the short term, and cooperation and 
development in the long term. That is the international principle of the ―Responsibility to 
protect‖ which is relevant, especially for the protection of IDPs.  
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2.3.2- The responsibility to protect IDPS 
 
The principle of the responsibility to protect was endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005 and unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in its Resolution 
1674 of 2006. However, the principle remains hotly contested primarily because of its 
association with humanitarian intervention and the pervasive belief that its principal aim is 
to create a pathway for the legitimization of unilateral military intervention. In fact, the 
principle of the responsibility to protect is not to be mixed up with humanitarian intervention 
which is focused on the right to intervene rather than to protect. As Gareth Evans and 
Mohamed Sahnoun argue, focusing on the "responsibility to protect" rather than the "right to 
intervene" implies evaluating the issues from the point of view of those needing support, 
rather than those who may be considering intervention. It implies also that ―the primary 
responsibility rests with the state concerned. Only if that state is unable or unwilling to 
fulfill its responsibility to protect, or is itself the perpetrator, should the international 
community take the responsibility to act in its place.‖87 
 
The principle of the responsibility to protect is grounded on the duty to protect 
communities from mass killings such as ethnic cleansing and genocide. The proper authority 
to conduct a military intervention on the basis of the responsibility to protect is the United 
Nations Security Council in conjunction with the other United Nations Organization 
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components such as the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, etc. The principle 
requires some precautions such as the ―the right intention‖, the use of military force only as 
―last resort‖, with ―proportional means‖, and in consideration of ―a reasonable chance of 
success.‖ 88 
 
Even though there is no guarantee that all these guiding criteria of the principle of the 
responsibility to protect will be actually respected in an operation of protection, this 
principle seems to create an opportunity for the protection of IDPs who are ―trapped within 
hostile borders.‖89 Refugees and IDPs are often victims of the state‘s system.  They usually 
come from states that have been involved in civil war, or that have failed to establish 
legitimacy in the eyes of their own citizens. In sum, they come from what one can consider 
―failed states‖ or ―collapsed states.‖90 The case of Sudan with the Darfur crisis is one of the 
most egregious examples of a failed state which still claims its sovereignty to refuse to some 
NGOs or intergovernmental organizations the access to IDPS on its territory. In the case of 
Sudan, for example, one can argue from the principle of the responsibility to protect that if 
the legitimization of the territorial state sovereignty is to provide an authority accountable 
for the well-being of its citizens, then the failure of individual states to discharge this task 
creates a responsibility on those who otherwise benefit from the system of states to aid those 
                                               
88 We can recognize here the criteria of Just War Theory. 
89 See Francis M. Deng, ―Trapped With Hostile Borders: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons,‖ in 
Human Security for All. A Tribute to Sergio Vieira de Mello, edited by Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Fordham 
University Press and The Center for International Health and Cooperation, 2004), 28-51. 
90 For more analysis, see for example, Satvinder Singh Juss, ―The Failed States Phenomenon,‖ International 
Migration and Global Justice (London: Ashgate, 2006), 103-143.  
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who suffer persecution in the territories in which they are nominally owed a primary duty of 
care. 
 
Moreover, the principle of the responsibility to protect develops a broad conception of 
protection for IDPs and refugees. It requires undertaking action to prevent an imminent 
crisis which can result in the creation of refugees or IDPs, and action to end an ongoing 
crisis, and finally action to consolidate peace and economic development in post-war 
countries in order to foster the resettlement of returned refugees and IDPs. As the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty wrote: 
The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: 
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal 
conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. 
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with 
appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international 
prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. 
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full 
assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm 
the intervention was designed to halt or avert. 91 
The principle of the responsibility to protect has not yet become part of customary 
international law. However, many organizations of the civil society have been urging UN 
agencies and governments to act on it. It is therefore a sign of hope for the improving of 
IDPs and refugees protection. 
 
 
                                               
91 See The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (December 2001): xi. 
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2.4- Conclusion 
 
Refugees and IDPs issues contain always a political dimension; and their protection is 
dependent on the political context of the moment. That is why states play a central role in 
defining who is a refugee, and in providing legal protection as well as determining actors 
that are authorized to deal with IDPs on their territory. However, today the old hierarchies of 
power and influence within the state are being reconfigured by increasing economic 
globalization and the ascendance of an international human rights regime. This explains why 
the Westphalian sovereignty paradigm of international relations, with its principles of 
sovereign immunity, domestic jurisdiction, and nonintervention has de facto been displaced 
by a new principle of civilian inviolability, or individual sovereignty. In other terms, the 
dignity and integrity of the individual and his ―right to protection‖ has become constitutive 
of global relations so that state sovereignty is to be understood as responsibility. This is a 
source of hope for the improving of refugee protection. 
 
Even if state sovereignty within its borders still matters, and even if states still 
dominate world politics, one should be more and more aware of these new changes where 
globalization undermines the traditional legal doctrine and moves it toward a kind of legal 
cosmopolitanism across national borders. Choosing to ignore these changes is a lack of 
realism. The ―reality‖ is that the contemporary world is in a transitional phase away from 
Westphalian order to a cosmopolitan world society order. This transitional phase is 
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confusing in the sense that some ―failed states‖ like Sudan can still claim their sovereignty 
to hinder the protection of IDPs and asylum-seekers on their territory. But this transitional 
phase is promising for the protection of refugees and IDPs in the sense that with the growing 
accountability of states to international human rights laws, refugees, IDPs and non-state 
actors like NGOs and churches can make claims on states for finding better solutions for the 
plights of refugees and IDPs. In fact, the principle of the responsibility to protect and other 
human rights-based guidelines are a kind of ―soft law‖ whose ―soft power‖ can have a great 
effect on state‘s responsibility toward refugees and IDPs. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH’S DISCOURSE ON 
BORDER CROSSINGS: A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME 
 
 
3.0- Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has shown from a secular standpoint how the ―Principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect‖ and the human-rights-based approach to refugees and IDPs issues 
challenge the actual international refugee protection regime which is based on states‘ 
sovereignty. This present chapter will show how the Roman Catholic Church‘s social 
discourse can provide a basis for this human rights approach to refugees and IDPs issues. 
Furthermore, the Catholic Church‘s social discourse goes farther than the secular discourse 
on refugee issues, since the Catholic Church‘s discourse on refugees is grounded in the 
experience of refugees themselves and in the belief that all humans belong to one human 
family.  
 
Since the Catholic Church‘s discourse is drawn from the biblical experience of borders 
crossings, in this chapter, firstly, I will present how Israel‘s experience of exile informed the 
Old Testament teachings on refugees and the understanding of national borders. The 
argument is that, because Israel had been a refugee in exile and had been saved by God, 
therefore Israel is exhorted to take care of the stranger and the refugee. Israel‘s relation to 
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the land is also informed by its experience of having been a refugee. The land is still the land 
of the Lord, so that Israel is not free within its territorial borders to do everything it wants, 
especially when lives of foreigners and refugees are at stake. I will also present how Israel‘s 
experience of exile is still relevant to the New Testament‘s teachings. Jesus had crossed 
many borders, both geographic and non-geographic. He had been a refugee in Egypt. He 
also came from ―Galilee of the nations‖ which is a model of a cosmopolitan world. So, 
aliens have been important in the New Testament teaching which can inspire ways of 
dealing with refugee issues from a Christian standpoint. 
 
Secondly, I will try to rethink the refugee regime from the perspective of Christian 
universalism through ethical principles such as the membership of all humans in one human 
family; the universal common good; the universal destination of the world wealth; the 
demand of solidarity, etc. I will strive to show how Christian universalism is not utopian; 
rather it also exhibits a realism that integrates state sovereignty within its borders and the 
principle of subsidiarity to engage the international community‘s responsibility and 
individual nation-state‘s responsibility. 
 
Finally, I will also discuss the relevance of the use of biblical and Christian social 
discourse in public debate on refugee issues. I will argue that even if the Christian 
experience of refugees is a particular experience, it is relevant to all humanity in the sense 
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that it is grounded in the dignity of human persons. This chapter will provide the ethical 
foundation of this thesis on refugees and IDPs issues from a Roman Catholic standpoint. 
  
3.1-The Biblical Experience of Border Crossings and Refugee Issues 
 
Neither Old nor New Testaments provide a specific policy for borders crossings and 
for refugees. However, each one records much related to refugees and aliens that can still be 
relevant nowadays. 
 
3.1.1- The Old Testament and Border Crossings 
 
This section will present how Ancient Israel‘s experience of having lived abroad as 
aliens and refugees shaped the Old Testament‘s discourse on refugees and on the 
understanding of the function of national borders. 
 
3.1.1.1- Ancient Israel’s experience of having lived outside its borders as aliens 
and refugees 
 
The experience of being forced to cross borders and to leave one‘s homeland, the 
experience of being a refugee, an alien, is not unfamiliar to the Old Testament. Above all, 
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this experience of being an alien or refugee had profoundly shaped Ancient Israel‘s 
character and identity as the people of God. As the Pontifical Council for Migrants and 
Refugees wrote: 
Israel traced its origins back to Abraham, who in obedience to God‘s call left his home and 
went to a foreign land, taking with him the divine Promise that he would become the father 
‗of a great nation‘ (Gn 12:1-2). Jacob, a wandering Aramaen, ‗went down into Egypt with a 
small household and lived there as an alien. But there he became a nation, great, strong and 
numerous‘ (Dt 26:5). After its long servitude in Egypt, Israel received its solemn investiture 
as the ‗People of God‘ during its forty-year ‗Exodus‘ through the desert. The hard test of 
migration and deportation is therefore fundamental to the story of the chosen people in view 
of the salvation of all peoples: Israel knew the return from exile (cf. Is 42:6-7; 49:5).
92
 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the Old Testament offers more accounts of people 
who are forced to cross borders than it offers accounts of people who migrated because they 
were pleased to do so.
93
 This shows the importance that the Old Testament ascribes to 
forced migrants whose lives are threatened by many dangers. For instance, Abram and his 
wife Sarai were forced to cross the border to Egypt and to reside there as – what we consider 
today to be – ―economic refugees,‖ for the famine was severe in the land of Canaan.94 
                                               
92 Pontifical Council for the Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, Erga migrantes caritas Christi, (The love 
of Christ towards migrants), Vatican City, 2004, no. 14. 
93 Daniel Carroll remarked that ―Some might contend that the Bible does not present details of the lives of 
immigrants but rather of refugees.‖ (p.71). For more analysis on the Bible preference for refugee accounts, see 
M. Daniel Carroll, Christians at the Border: Immigration, the Church, and the Bible (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Baker Academic, 2008); see chapter 2: “Of Immigrants, Refugees, and Exiles: Guidance from the Old 
Testament,‖ pp.63-89. 
94 Gen 12:10-20. See also Jean-Pierre Ruiz, ―Abram and Sarai cross the Border: Reading Genesis 12:10-20 
with People on the Move,‖ in Border Crossings: Cross-Cultural Hermeneutics, edited by D.N. Premnath 
(Maryknoll & New York: Orbis Books, 2007), 15-34. 
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Likewise, Isaac would also be forced to cross the border to the Philistine land to avoid 
starvation.
95
   
 
Besides famines, forced exile due to war had driven many Israelites out of their 
homeland. The Second Book of Kings provides a record of the Israelites‘ deportation to 
Assyria: ―In the ninth year of Hoshea, the king of Assyria took Samaria, and deported the 
Israelites to Assyria, settling them in Halah, at the Habor, a river of Gozan, and in the cities 
of the Medes.‖ (2Kings 17:6). Furthermore, Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon deported 
thousands of Israelites to Babylon:  
He deported all Jerusalem: all the officers and men of the army, ten thousand in number, and 
all the craftsmen and smiths. None were left among the people of the land except the poor. 
He deported Jehoiachin to Babylon, and also led captive from Jerusalem to Babylon the 
king's mother and wives, his functionaries, and the chief men of the land. The king of 
Babylon also led captive to Babylon all seven thousand men of the army, and a thousand 
craftsmen and smiths, all of them trained soldiers. (2Kings 24:14-16). 
 
This experience of being a forced migrant seems to be so fundamental that many of 
the leaders of ancient Israel had this experience. This was the case with Abraham
96
 who 
sojourned in Egypt, in Canaan, in the region of Negeb, etc. Isaac lived as an alien at 
Mamre,
97
 at Canaan.
98
 Jacob was in the same situation in Mahanaim and in other places.
99
 It 
                                               
95 Gen 26:1. 
96 Gen. 12:10; 17:8; 20:1; 21:34; 23:4. 
97 Gen. 35:27. 
98 Gen. 37:1. 
99 Gen. 32:3-4. 
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was also the case with Joseph in Egypt
100
 and Daniel in Babylon.
101
 Moses fled from Egypt 
and sought refuge in Midian.
102
 David fled to the land of the Philistines in order to escape 
from Saul.
103
  Israelites, therefore, experienced the situation of living as aliens in foreign 
countries such as Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, etc. They had this experience not only as 
individuals but also as a people, as a community. This means that this experience 
characterized their identity as individuals as well as a community. Forced exile, as well as 
Exodus, is part of Israelites‘ live stories and history. The Old Testament‘s approach to 
borders crossings and to refugee issues is very significant as it is grounded both in refugee 
experience and in a tradition of welcoming forced migrants. To what extent does this 
particular situation shape Judaism and Christian discourse on people on the move? 
 
3.1.1.2- Israel’s attitude toward forced migrants within its borders 
 
The Old Testament‘s attitude towards aliens, in general, and forced migrants, in 
particular, is marked with compassion and justice. The presence of refugees and aliens in the 
midst of Israelites reminds Israelites of their own sufferings and fragility when they were in 
the same position. Beyond the capacity to recogmize suffering in the first place, Israelites‘ 
                                               
100 Gen. 37:28.36. 
101 Dan. 1:1-4. 
102 Exod. 2:11-14. 
103 1 Sam. 27. 
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compassion enabled them to learn to respond to that suffering in a particular way
104
. One of 
the ways to respond to the suffering of forced migrants and aliens was to accord them legal 
protection. The obligation to protect forced migrants is rooted in the fact that Israel had 
experienced and had survived forced migration. From this perspective, Israel is asked not to 
oppress aliens: ―You shall not oppress an alien; you well know how it feels to be an alien, 
since you were once aliens yourselves in the land of Egypt.‖ (Exo. 23:9).105 Therefore, 
because the Israelites had experienced mistreatment and injustice, they were required to 
make every effort to spare aliens all manners of mistreatments. As Hoffmeier explains, 
The oppressive treatment that Israelites experienced as aliens in Egypt is without a doubt the 
main reason so many of the laws deal with the alien in Israel. After all, Israel knew what it 
was like to be an alien and to be harshly treated. Consequently, it is not surprising that God 
gave so many statutes concerning the appropriate treatment of aliens.
106
 
 
However, the Israelites‘ attitude towards forced migrants within Israel‘s borders can 
also find a justification in the belief that all human beings are created in the image of God.
107
 
Accordingly, all humans share the same dignity. This is why Israelites are asked not only to 
provide forced migrants with protection, but also to love them and not to have separate rules 
                                               
104 Christopher P. Vogt, ―Fostering a Catholic Commitment to the Common Good: An Approach Rooted in 
Virtue Ethics,‖ Theological Studies 68 (2007): 394-417. 
105 See also Exo 22:21. 
106 James K. Hoffmeier, The Immigration Crisis. Immigrants, Aliens, and the Bible (Wheaton, Illinois: 
Crossway Books, 2009), 72. 
107 Gen. 1:27. 
 
 
63 
 
for aliens.
108
 Yet, it is important to remark that not all aliens benefit from this legal situation. 
In fact, the Old Testament distinguishes two categories of aliens.
109
 On one hand, there is the 
transient foreigner designated by the Hebrew words: nekhar, nolchrt, or zar. He does not 
have the status of a legal alien since he is a passing foreigner. For that reason, his rights are 
restricted. For instance, he can neither have access to the land by being a landowner, nor 
have access to the temple. Nevertheless, he has the right to hospitality and protection. On the 
other hand, there is the resident alien who is a legal alien. He is designated by the Hebrew 
word: ger. We should underscore the fact that ―the word ger carries with it the conception of 
a people under attack who have been driven out of their land by famine or war.‖110   
 
Usually, the Old Testament speaks more often about the forced migrant (ger) who was 
constrained to leave his homeland than about a wanderer alien (nekhar, zar). Thus, the 
refugee and the forced migrant, in general, are entitled to enjoy the same rights and the same 
protection as native Israelites. However, not all refugees were protected. Those who were 
guilty of grave wrongdoing were supposed to be punished, and even they might be sent back 
home in order to be punished for their wrongdoings. Refugees who were found guilty of 
                                               
108 Num. 15:15-16: ―There is but one rule for you and for the resident alien, a perpetual rule for all your 
descendants. Before the LORD you and the alien are alike, with the same law and the same application of it for 
the alien residing among you as for yourselves.‖ See also the commentary by James K. Hoffmeier, The 
Immigration Crisis, 76. 
109 See James K. Hoffmeier, The Immigration Crisis, 150. See also chapters 2-4. 
110 Elizabeth G. Ferris, Beyond Borders, xxix. 
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grave wrongdoings were even denied sanctuary protection
111
. According to James 
Hoffmeier,  
The biblical practice of sanctuary, then, was to protect the offender from vigilante justice and 
to ensure that he received a fair trial. Should a person come to the sanctuary who was guilty 
of intentionally murdering someone, he would be removed from the protection of the 
sanctuary and receive his punishment. This practice is clearly spelled out in Exodus 21:14: 
‗take him away from my altar and put him to death.‘112 
 
Thus, there is clearly an imperative in the Old Testament to provide refuge to people 
who have been driven out of their land and who seek protection. One can also argue that the 
refusal of sanctuary to grave evildoers participates in the imperative of protection in the 
sense that the Old Testament prohibits anyone from being an accomplice of severe 
evildoers.  To what extent can the church today embody this imperative of protection of 
refugees and of all forced migrants? Before dealing with this question, let us explore how 
the Old Testament conceives territorial borders and the sovereignty of the state within its 
borders. 
 
                                               
111 Sanctuary protection is a protection that was entrusted to people who found refuge in the temple. When 
somebody takes refuge in a temple, this gives him a kind of sacred immunity that prevents him to be removed 
from the temple as long as this person stays in the temple. Nowadays, many churches still practice sanctuary 
protection by allowing refugees or undocumented people to take refuge in churches in order to avoid their 
arrest and deportation. About the practice of sanctuary in the United States of America, see James K. 
Hoffmeier, The Immigration Crisis, 80. 
112 Ibid., 84. 
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3.1.1.3- Israel’s conception of land and borders 
 
In order to understand Israel‘s attitude and laws that concern refugees within Israel‘s 
borders, it is important to understand how Israel conceives the land on which it dwelt. To 
begin with, we have to acknowledge that Israel‘s understanding of the land is very complex 
and varies from one biblical book to another.
113
 It varies also from various theologies that 
are intertwined in the Old Testament.
114
 In fact, the theme of the land is central to the Old 
Testament in general since the land is essential to Israel's existence. The land is the object of 
one of the most important promises that Yahweh made to Israel; it is also part of the 
covenantal relationship between Yahweh and Israel.
115
  
 
Most relevant to this reflection is that the land is a gift to Israel. Even though Israel 
fought against other nations in order to possess the land, the land remains a gift that Yahweh 
had promised to their fathers. From this perspective, the land remains the land of Yahweh 
that has been entrusted to Israel. We can say that from the biblical perspective, Israel‘s 
relation to the land is not exactly a relation of ownership; it is more about a relation of 
stewardship. Therefore, within the borders of the land, Israel is not free to do what it wants 
without regard to Yahweh. For this reason, the sovereignty of Israel within its territorial 
                                               
113 See Patrick D. Miller, ―The Gift of God. The Deuteronomic Theology of Land,‖ Interpretation 23, no. 40 
(1969): 451-465. 
114 About the various theologies of the land in the Old Testament see Peter Diepold, Israel’s Land, BWANT 95 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1972). 
115 See Deut. 1:8, 35; 6:10; etc.  For more details, read Gerhard von Rad, ―The Promised Land and Yahweh's 
Land in the Hexateuch,‖ in The Problem of the Hexa-teuch and Other Essays. Trans, by E. W. Trueman 
Dicken (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 90f. 
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borders is to be interpreted as being a responsibility. Israel‘s political leaders are 
accountable before Yahweh and before the citizens. They have the responsibility to defend 
the borders of the land against external invasion. They also have the responsibility to protect 
all citizens and aliens living within Israel‘s borders, and also to ensure that they retain the 
possibility to satisfy their basic needs. This explains Israel‘s concern for the refugee, the 
alien, the orphan, and the widow.
116
 
 
Because the land entrusted to Israel still belongs to Yahweh, it is considered to be a 
holy land. Accordingly, Israel is asked to act within its borders as Yahweh would have done. 
Likewise, refugees and aliens are also supposed to respect the laws that Yahweh prescribed 
to Israel regarding the proper manner of dwelling in the land. As we read in Leviticus,  
You, however, whether natives or resident aliens, must keep my statutes and decrees 
forbidding all such abominations by which the previous inhabitants defiled the land; 
otherwise the land will vomit you out also for having defiled it, just as it vomited out the 
nations before you. (Lev. 18:26-27). 
 
This citation from Leviticus shows that borders were important. Territorial borders and 
national sovereignty were acknowledged by the law in Old Testament.
117
 That is why 
permission is needed in order to cross national borders.
118
 Nevertheless, because of the 
sanctity both of life and of the land, Israel was asked to open its borders to forced migrants 
whose lives were at stake. Since Israel was supposed to act within its borders as Yahweh 
                                               
116 See Mark Sneed, ―Israel Concern for the Alien, Orphan, and Widow: Altruism or Ideology?‖ Zeitschrift für 
die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 111, no. 4 (1999): 498-507. 
117 See Deut. 27:17: ―Cursed be he who moves his neighbor's landmarks! ...‖ 
118 See Num. 20:16-21.  See also James K. Hoffmeier, The Immigration Crisis, 32-33. 
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would have done, the practice of sanctuary, hospitality, justice, and compassion towards 
refugees were, therefore, requirements of the covenantal law in the land given by the Lord. 
The New Testament teachings on forced migrants will echo the Old Testament experience of 
forced migration. The New Testament will emphasize the Old Testament‘s idea of the image 
of God and the theology of all as creatures of the one God and as brothers and sisters in the 
same family. 
 
3.1.2- The New Testament Teachings on Border Crossings and Refugees 
 
I will briefly analyze Jesus‘ attitude toward aliens in the New Testament and I will 
draw from it some ethical principles for Christian attitude toward refugees. I will also try to 
understand how the New Testament dealt with national borders and what constitutes the 
right way for Christians today to relate to the countries of which they are citizens. 
 
3.1.2.1- Jesus’ experience of border Crossings and of being a refugee 
 
We do not know much about Jesus‘ experience of being a refugee. We only know 
from the Gospel of Matthew that shortly after his birth, the child Jesus‘ parents had to flee 
from Bethlehem to Egypt in order to escape from Herod the Great who wanted to kill 
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Jesus
119
. Nevertheless, if we do not know much about the asylum of Jesus and his parents in 
Egypt, we know much more about how Jesus dealt with outsiders. Jesus‘ attitude toward 
non-Jews was full of respect and compassion. For instance, Samaritans were considered by 
Jews to be religious outsiders, and even enemies.
120
  Jesus transcended this hostility and 
dealt with Samaritans in the same way as he did with Jews. Furthermore, it happened that 
Jesus presented Samaritans as models. Such is the case in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan.
121
 It is also the case in the parable of the ten lepers who, after they had been 
cured, only one of them (the one who was a Samaritan) came back to thank Jesus.
122
 As 
Carroll explains,  
Jesus transcends the longstanding enmity between the Jews and Samaritans. He accepted the 
―other‖, and they accept him. In all of this, Jesus never ceases to be a Jew. Yet, he is able to 
integrate his cultural core with other transcendent commitments and gracious attitudes that 
moves him beyond the closed society of his peers.123 
 
That is why Jesus‘ attitude toward Samaritans and other outsiders is relevant to 
refugee issues. Being a refugee implies being an outsider. Cultural, religious, or ethnic 
differences that define the outsider are less important than the dignity of the outsider. Jesus‘ 
teachings appeal to the common humanity of natives and aliens. Saint Paul emphasizes this 
                                               
119 See Mat. 2:23-15: ―When they had departed, behold, the angel of the Lord appeared to Joseph in a dream 
and said, ‗Rise, take the child and his mother, flee to Egypt, and stay there until I tell you. Herod is going to 
search for the child to destroy him.‘ Joseph rose and took the child and his mother by night and departed for 
Egypt. He stayed there until the death of Herod, that what the Lord had said through the prophet might be 
fulfilled, ‗Out of Egypt I called my son‘.” 
120 The Gospel gives many accounts of the hostility between Jews and Samaritans. See for example Luke 9:51-
56; Mark 3:17; John 4: 1-38. See also M. Daniel Carroll, Christians at the Border: Immigration, the Church, 
and the Bible (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008), 116-123. 
121 See Luke 10:30-37. 
122 See Luke 17:16. 
123 M. Daniel Carroll, Christians at the Border, 120. 
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idea by saying to the Ephesian community that they were no longer foreigners and aliens, 
but fellow citizens with God‘s people and members of God‘s household.124 The New 
Testament therefore claims the dignity of all humans regardless of their status as either 
aliens or citizens. 
 
Furthermore, Jesus taught his disciples that God is the Father of all and not of Jews 
only. That is why, since the early Church, Christians promote the belief of a universal 
fraternity according to which all are brothers and sisters in Christ. For refugees, to be 
recognized and accepted as brothers and sisters is a very significant way to acknowledge 
their dignity, and therefore to give them protection since they have been recognized as 
belonging to the same human family. From this perspective, we can infer that Jesus‘ 
teachings and attitude toward aliens suggest that nothing should undermine refugee dignity. 
The fact of having crossed a border and being outside of one‘s homeland should not obscure 
the fundamental value of the refugee as human. This way of thinking challenges any rules 
and behaviors that threaten refugees in their humanity. In addition, Jesus‘ compassionate 
behavior toward the marginalized of any society, and particularly refugees and outsiders, 
corroborates the fact that nothing should undermine the dignity of anyone. Jesus identified 
himself with the refugee, the stranger who seeks asylum: ―… For I was… a stranger and you 
welcomed me.‖ (Mat. 25:35). This creates an imperative for Christians and all humankind to 
respond to refugees and aliens who are in need of protection.  Thus, the New Testament 
                                               
124 Eph. 2:19. 
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deals with refugees in such ways that their dignity as humans is acknowledged and 
protected. There is also a claim for justice and compassion for refugees. In order to complete 
this brief survey about the New Testament and refugees, it is important that we answer the 
key question regarding how the New Testament deals with borders. 
 
3.1.2.2- Borders and Land in the New Testament 
 
The New Testament‘s conception of land is not obvious.125 In fact, the term ―land‖ is 
rare in the New Testament, a body of diverse literature that uses many other terms which 
imply land such as ―temple‖, ―Jerusalem‖, ―Zion‖, ―Kingdom of God/heaven‖, etc.  The 
New Testament conceives land as a geo-political territory such as Galilee, Samaria, Judea, 
etc. It recognizes the authority of these political entities to control their borders. For 
example, Saint Luke reported that Jesus had to receive permission to cross a Samaritan 
village. For this reason, Jesus sent his disciples ahead of him, but they were denied 
permission to cross the village:  
When the days for his being taken up were fulfilled, he resolutely determined to journey to 
Jerusalem, and he sent messengers ahead of him. On the way they entered a Samaritan 
village to prepare for his reception there, but they would not welcome him because the 
destination of his journey was Jerusalem. (Luke 9:51-53). 
 
However, the conception of land as a geo-political territory is overwhelmed by 
spiritual, transcendental, and eschatological conceptions of land. Whereas the Old Testament 
                                               
125 For further analysis, see Bruce Walkte, ―The New Testament Doctrine of Land,‖ in Border Crossings: 
Explorations of an Interdisciplinary Historian Festschrift for Irving Hexham, ed., Ulrich van der Heyden and 
Andreas Feldtkeller (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2008), 379-394. 
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was focused on the Promised Land and had tried to enact laws for people living within the 
borders of the Promised Land, the New Testament is focused on the body of Christ and life 
in Christ. The Promised Land is replaced by the Body of Christ. Likewise, the body of 
Christ in John‘s gospel replaces the earthly temple of Jerusalem.126 That is why Bruce 
Waltke argues that ―in both the gospel of John and in the apostolic teaching, the land is 
‗Christified‘.‖127 From the same perspective, land has an eschatological meaning in the 
sense that it can refer to a heavenly country whose foundations and architect is God as the 
Letter to the Hebrews stated.
128
 Perhaps the doctrine of land in the New Testament is better 
expressed through the notion of ―Kingdom of God‖ that occurs more than sixty times in the 
New Testament.
129
 The kingdom of God is both an earthly and heavenly kingdom. Although 
it does not refer to a geo-political entity, it is a reality that has been inaugurated by Jesus‘ 
preaching in Galilee;
130
 it transcends territorial and cultural boundaries. It is also a spiritual 
space that includes universal space and time because it is a ―yet-and-not-yet-kingdom‖ 
which will be fully realized in heaven at the end of ages. 
 
This understanding of land influences the Christian way of inhabiting the earth and of 
relating to borders. Christians live in civic entities called countries and they are supposed to 
                                               
126 John 2:19-21: ―Jesus answered and said to them, ‗Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up.‘ 
The Jews said, ‗This temple has been under construction for forty-six years, and you will raise it up in three 
days?‘ But he was speaking about the temple of his body.‖ 
127 Bruce Waltke, ―The New Testament Doctrine of Land,‖ 388. 
128 Heb. 11:9-10: ―By faith he sojourned in the promised land as in a foreign country, dwelling in tents with 
Isaac and Jacob, heirs of the same promise; for he was looking forward to the city with foundations, whose 
architect and maker is God.‖ 
129 See James K. Hoffmeier, The Immigration Crisis, 136-137. 
130 See Mark 1:14-15. 
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be fully engaged in the search for the common good of their society. Nevertheless, they 
believe that they have no earthly homeland because the latter prefigured the final destination 
that is the heavenly city of God. That is why Christians can consider themselves to be aliens 
in this world, because their citizenship of the kingdom of God is prior to their citizenship in 
the countries to which they belong. This changes the way of dealing with territorial and non-
geographical borders because borders become relativized, no longer absolute. From now on, 
what is fundamental is not national citizenship, but membership in the kingdom of God 
which concerns every human being.  
 
There is no claim here for a world without borders. Borders are still important. 
However, the claim here is, on one hand, that there are values which are more essential than 
borders; and, on the other hand, that borders should aim at the protection of all humans. That 
is why borders should not be considered as barriers that prevent people from encountering 
each other; borders are frontiers that allow communication between people while preserving 
their identities. Jesus himself crossed many borders; and Christianity itself is about crossing 
borders. As Virgilio Elizondo wrote,  
From its very inception, Christianity is about crossing apparently impenetrable borders for 
the sake of a new unity – the unity of a new source of family belonging. The eternal Son of 
God crossed the border between the eternal and the temporal, between the divine and the 
human to become Jesus of Nazareth. As the New Testament affirms, he emptied himself of 
his divinity to take on the form of man (Phil.2:6), or even stronger, the eternal word which 
was God became flesh and dwelt among us. And the very geographical-historical place 
where this took place was in Galilee, cross-roads of the peoples were considered impure and 
73 
 
inferior precisely because here the boundaries of identity and belonging were constantly 
crossed if for no other reason than for basic survival.131 
 
The important question that emerges from this biblical analysis is this: What ethical insights 
can we draw from this brief biblical analysis for the international refugee protection regime?  
 
3.2- Christian Universalism and the International Refugee Protection 
Regime 
 
The ethical insights that emerged from the biblical experience of refugees and borders 
crossings can be summarized in what we can name ―Christian Universalism‖.  This 
universalism challenges the current international refugee protection regime for the reason 
that this universalism implies some ethical principles such as the membership of all humans 
in one human family; the universal common good; the universal destination of earthly 
wealth; the demands of solidarity, etc. Let us briefly explain to what extent these principles 
challenge the current refugee protection regime. 
 
                                               
131 Virgilio Elizondo, ―Transformation of Borders. Border Separation or a New Identity ?‖ In Negotiating 
Borders: Theological Explorations in the Global Era. Essays in Honour of Prof. Felix Wilfred, ed., Patrick 
Gnanapragasam and Elisabeth Schüssler Florenza (Delhi: ISPCK, 2008), 25. 
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3.2.1-The international community as one human family and refugee issues 
 
Of great significance here is that the Roman Catholic Church‘s social teachings deal 
with refugees always in relation to the entire human family. Accordingly, the way to honor 
refugee dignity is to locate it always within the human family. Refugees are entirely part of 
the human family; and they have to be treated as such, since their dignity as humans stands 
above all things.
132
 The originality of the Catholic Church‘s teachings on refugees resides in 
the fact that the starting point of its discourse is not the state and border protection; rather, it 
is the human person and her dignity. This perspective brings new insight into refugee issues 
because it regards the international community not as a community of nation-states, but 
rather as a community of peoples who belong to one human family. From this standpoint, 
membership in the human family is more important than membership in a specific country 
as John XXIII stated: ―The fact that one is a citizen of a particular State does not detract in 
any way from his membership in the human family as a whole, nor from his citizenship in 
the world community.‖133 
 
Conceiving the international community as based on peoples means that the most 
important value that nation-states should pursue within and beyond their borders is respect 
for the dignity of humans. Nation-states-based international community often fails to 
                                               
132 Second Vatican Council, ―Gaudium et Spes,‖ no.26. 
133 John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris, 1963, no.25. 
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reconcile national and international interests. That is why persons-based international 
community is more likely to allow wide agreement in the sense that the dignity of persons is 
accepted by almost all people in the world. This view of the international community is 
human rights-based. It is therefore more effective in addressing refugee issues. Thus, this 
persons-based view of international community places the individual person at the center of 
world politics. Commenting on the importance of human dignity in Roman Catholic Church 
social teachings, David Hollenbach argues that: 
The worth of human beings, in other words, is the standard by which political and legal 
institutions are to be evaluated. Politics and law are to serve persons. Persons do not exist to 
serve the political and legal order. The human person is never simply of functional or 
utilitarian value. Human beings possess a transcendental worth not hypothetically 
subordinate to any other end.134 
 
Hence, conceiving the international community as one human family offers many 
opportunities to justify great efforts to protect human beings whose dignity is considered to 
be the fundamental value in national and international politics. The main purpose of 
international politics is to recognize and protect human dignity everywhere. This 
understanding of international politics transforms the international refugee protection regime 
in the sense that the latter shifts from a state-power-based perspective to a human-rights-
based perspective that ―softens national borders‖ when the dignity of persons is at stake, as 
it is for refugees.  
 
                                               
134 David Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 43-44. 
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However, the problem of boundaries remains. In the actual states-based international 
refugee protection regime, national territorial boundaries constitute an important issue in 
protecting refugees and internally displaced people; while in a person-based international 
refugee protection regime as suggested by the Catholic social teachings, cultural, ethnic or 
religious boundaries remain an important issue. For instance, the opposition between the 
Western cultural tradition and the Muslim Arab cultural tradition, which could escalate in 
the so-called fight against terrorism, corroborates the thesis of Samuel P. Huntington who 
states that ―the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will 
be cultural… The principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and 
groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the 
future.‖135 In a way parallel to Huntington, Dominique Moisi suggests a clash of 
emotions.
136
  
 
The threat against this view of the international community as one human family 
comes from the fact that people of different religious or cultural traditions do not have the 
same conception of human beings and their relation to others, or to states. Because of this 
diversity, even the definition of human rights becomes problematic. Yet, the threat to the 
                                               
135 Samuel P. Huntington, ―The Clash of Civilizations?,‖ in Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22. For 
Huntington, a civilization is a cultural entity like villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious 
groups, etc. Entities have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. 
136 Dominique Moisi, using an argument different from that of Huntington but which dovetails with it, 
emphasizes emotions. He states that the world today faces not only a clash of civilizations but a clash of 
emotions as well. The West displays (and is divided by) a culture of fear, while the Arab and Muslim worlds 
are trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope. Like Huntington, Moisi 
considers these different cultures of fear, humiliation, or hope, as a threat to peace and to human rights. See 
Dominique Moisi, ―The Clash of Emotions,‖ Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (January/February 2007). 
77 
 
realization of an international community as one family where refugees can feel at home is 
not related immediately to the diversity of cultures and religions; it is related nonetheless to 
the boundaries that cultures and religions raise to define and protect their identities. In fact, 
to define one‘s identity means to seek what makes one different from others. In other words, 
to define an identity means to determine what one is not. This establishes boundaries of 
identity. When these identity-shaping differences are considered to be more fundamental 
than the dignity of the human person, they become dangerous and destructive for an 
understanding of the international community as a human family where refugees can expect 
better treatment. It is an ideal to consider that ―beyond differences of language, race, 
ethnicity, gender, culture, and nation, we are one human family,‖ as claimed the U.S. 
Bishops.
137
 However, this ideal is a challenge for the actual international refugee protection 
regime. 
 
The Roman Catholic Church‘s social teachings regarding universalism are not unique; 
this universalism echoes secular cosmopolitan views of world community and politics. 
Cosmopolitans value individuals over sovereign states. As Appiah states: ―They believe in 
human dignity across the nations, and they live their creed.‖ 138 Cosmopolitanism suggests 
that we take seriously human differences and that we posit the universality across 
                                               
137 United States National Catholic Conference of Bishops, ―Called to Global Solidarity: International 
Challenges for U.S. Parishes,‖ November 12, 1997; available from: 
http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/globalsolidarity.shtml; accessed on 10/24/2009. 
138 K. A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2006), 137. 
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differences. Cosmopolitanism claims that all people are bound together by their humanity 
and by common values. These common values are not inferred by a positivist deduction, but 
they emerge from interaction among different people. This interaction makes 
cosmopolitanism tolerant but not relativist. There are shared values which arise in a 
consensus at the process of interaction,
139
 or through the process of what John Rawls calls 
―overlapping consensus‖. Moreover, in Appiah‘s perspective, cosmopolitanism is a 
universal trait of humankind in a world of strangers. Cosmopolitanism opens up an 
opportunity to bridge worlds and to work in the interest of human beings. Cosmopolitans 
consider themselves to be world citizens.
140
 Thus, they refuse to give in to the temptations of 
the narrow nationalisms of the countries where they were born. Hence, cosmopolitanism
141
 
and the Catholic Church‘s social thought give a new perspective on refugee issues by 
interpreting the world as being one human family, and by developing the idea of world 
citizenship. Such a world is safer for refugees and IDPs whose dignity can be respected in 
countries where they are not citizens, but where their dignity as fellow humans is 
acknowledged. In such a world, territorial borders play a new role. 
 
                                               
139 Ibid., 66-67. 
140 Ibid., xv. 
141 About the relation between Catholic social thought universalism and cosmopolitanism, it is important to 
note that Appiah quotes Saint Paul on the oneness of humanity: ―There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is 
neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for you are all one in Christ Jesus.‖ (Gal. 3:28). See 
also K.A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, xiv. 
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3.2.2-Borders transcended: The Universal Common Good and refugee issues 
 
In addition to conceiving the world as one human family, the Roman Catholic 
Church‘s discourse on refugees is also grounded on the principle of the common good. 
According to the Second Vatican Council, ―the common good… is the sum total of social 
conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment 
more fully and more easily.‖142  The common good is not only the good for a specific 
country; rather it is the universal common good that concerns the entire human race
143
. That 
is why Pope John XXIII exhorted Christians and non-Christians ―to take an active part in 
public life, and to contribute towards the attainment of the common good of the entire 
human family as well as to that of their own country.‖144 
 
From the perspective of the universal common good, refugees and IDPs deserve the 
benefits associated with the solidarity of the international community; and especially when 
their lives are at stake. As part of the human family, refugees should be attended to by 
providing them with asylum and material means so that they may lead a dignified life as 
human beings. The demand of solidarity toward refugees is also grounded in the principle of 
―the universal destination of goods‖ according to which ―God destined the earth and all it 
contains for all men and all peoples so that all created things would be shared fairly by all 
                                               
142 Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, no.26. 
143 Ibid., no.26. 
144 John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris, 1963, no.146. 
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mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity.‖145 Since the earth belongs to 
humanity in common, there is a demand of solidarity for all within and beyond the borders 
of countries. Thus, the responsibility to protect refugees and other forced migrants is a 
shared responsibility for all humanity.
146
  
 
Therefore, the principle of the universal common good and its implications such as the 
universal destination of goods transcend borders. That is, national borders are not 
meaningful by themselves; their meaning should be drawn from moral principles such as the 
universal common good and the human family. These moral principles that transcend 
national borders do not obviate the utility of territorial borders. Borders are still important. 
Nevertheless, they are reconceptualized as an assignment of responsibility in the seeking of 
the good for a particular citizenry. However, this particular good should not stand in 
opposition to the universal common good. The duty of governments within state borders 
consists in promoting both the national common good and the good of all humanity as Pope 
John XXIII stated in Pacem in Terris:  
We must remember that, of its very nature, civil authority exists, not to confine its people 
within the boundaries of their nation, but rather to protect, above all else the common good 
of that particular civil society, which certainly cannot be divorced from the common good of 
the entire human family.147 
 
                                               
145 Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, no.69. 
146 See John II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, 1991, no.51. 
147 John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris, 1963, no.98. 
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It is not an easy task to hold together the universal common good and the particular 
good of individual nation-states from the perspective of refugees and IDPs protection. In 
fact, the receiving countries emphasize control of borders while the sending countries, 
Churches, and other organizations emphasize human rights and the universal common good. 
Moreover, on one hand the international community elaborates the right to leave one‘s 
country, but not the right to enter another country; on the other hand the Roman Catholic 
Church‘s social discourse claims the right for forced-migrants to leave their countries; and 
the receiving country has the duty to protect forced migrants by providing them asylum. 
Obviously, there are many tensions between Christian universalism and the ways that states 
handle refugee issues. In a world of states, the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church 
will remain merely utopian if we do not find ways to reconcile this universalism with the 
reality of what is going on regarding the practice of refugees and IDPs protection today.  I 
suggest that the principle of subsidiarity and Christian realism – as an ethical approach – can 
help to bring about the realization of Christian universalism so that it may appear less 
utopian. 
 
3.2.3- Christian realism and the principle of subsidiarity in refugee issues  
 
Christian universalism that favors the international refugee protection regime is not 
utopian. It is a universalism grounded in realism. However, it is not grounded in a desperate 
realism that merely acknowledges the socio-political realities of the plight of refugees and 
IDPs; rather, it is an optimistic realism that acknowledges the socio-political situation of 
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refugees and IDPs and dares to imagine progress. Christian realism, as developed by 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Eric Patterson,
148
 seriously takes into account the presence of sin in 
the world, but refuses to consider the world evil since God is still present in the world. 
Christian realism does not presume that the earth will become heaven, but thinks that the 
earth should have heaven as its horizon, that is to say, that life on earth should aim at the 
beatific life in heaven. 
 
From the perspective of Christian universalism informed by realism, national borders 
are transcended; but they still are relevant and they serve to define territories where 
governments can plan and try to achieve the national common good in tandem with the 
pursuit of the universal common good. The social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church 
do not strive for a world without borders; rather, they value borders as an effective space for 
promoting the common good. That is why the Second Vatican Council
149
 recognized the 
right of governments, in a particular context, to regulate the flow of migration.
150
 However, 
there is an imperative for governments to welcome forced migrants whose lives are 
threatened. Drew Christiansen argues that:  
                                               
148 See Eric Patterson, ed., Christianity and Power Politics Today: Christian Realism and Contemporary 
Political Dilemmas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 180. 
149 Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Gaudium et Spes, no.87. See also the Pontifical Council for the 
Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, Erga migrantes caritas Christi (The love of Christ towards 
migrants), (Vatican City: Vatican Editions, 2004), no.21. 
150 On states‘ rights to control the movement of migrants, see Drew Christiansen, ―Sacrament of Unity: Ethical 
Issues in Pastoral Care of Migrants and Refugees,‖ in Office of Pastoral Care of Migrants and Refugees, 
Bishops‘ Committee on Migration, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Today’s Immigrants and 
Refugees: A Christian Understanding (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, Inc., 1988), 88-
89. 
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Where governments either prey on their own people or fail to protect their rights, borders 
ought not have any moral weight. Where governments are prepared to shoulder their burden 
for the universal common good through an adequate refugee regime and where borders can 
help them promote the common good domestically, there the control of borders continues to 
have some relevance.151 
 
Yet, the notion of common good does not yield obvious conclusions and it is not 
easily malleable as a norm which should guide decisions on refugee issues.
152
 Nevertheless, 
the notion of common good engages different parties in a useful dialogue and discernment 
regarding the good for all. This dialogue is worth pursuing in the building up of society, in 
general, and in finding solution to social issues such as refugee plights. 
 
Informed by realism, the universalism of the social teachings of the Roman Catholic 
Church does not override the responsibility of local authorities. Even though the plight of 
refugees and IDPs should be a concern for the entire human family, the Roman Catholic 
Church states that they first come under the countries where refugees or IDPs originate. 
According to the principle of subsidiarity, it is the duty of the country of origin of refugees 
and IDPs to resolve the crisis that drove out the people. The international community ought 
to compel this country to find solutions to the unmet needs. In case the country of origin of 
refugees and IDPs is not willing to address the causes that drive people out of their 
homeland, then the principle of subsidiarity allows the international community to engage in 
                                               
151 Drew Christiansen, ―Movement, Asylum, Borders: Christian Perspectives,‖ International Migration Review 
30, no. 1 (Special Issue: Ethics, Migration, and Global Stewardship), (Spring 1996): 16. 
152 For more analysis regarding difficulties in applying the norm of common good in migration issues, read 
Dana W. Wilbanks, ―Response to Christiansen and Plaut,‖ International Migration Review 30, no. 1 (Special 
Issue: Ethics, Migration, and Global Stewardship), (Spring 1996): 27-36. 
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humanitarian intervention
153
 to resolve the crisis and to save lives even against the will of 
the ―failed state‖: ―Thus, a failure of national governments to protect the rights of persons 
results in the need and the duty of outside authorities taking action on behalf of victimized 
population‖154. As John Paul II stated in his 1993 address to the diplomatic corps: 
Once the possibilities afforded by diplomatic negotiations and the procedures provided for by 
international agreements and organizations have been put into effect, and that [sic], 
nevertheless, populations are succumbing to the attacks of an unjust aggressor, states no 
longer have a "right to indifference." It seems clear that their duty is to disarm this aggressor, 
if all other means have proved ineffective. The principles of the sovereignty of states and of 
non-interference in their internal affairs — which retain all their value — cannot constitute a 
screen behind which torture and murder may be carried out.155 
Here the Roman Catholic Church‘s position on the infringement of national sovereignty in 
order to protect people against governments is in coherence with the principle of ―The 
Responsibility to Protect‖ which has been already discussed in the previous chapter156. 
 
                                               
153 For the conditions of undertaking a humanitarian intervention from the perspective of the Roman Catholic 
Church social discourse, read the pastoral letter of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The 
Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace: Pastoral Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary of the Challenge of Peace 
(Washington, DC: USCC, 1993). 
154 See also Drew Christiansen, ―Movement, Asylum, Borders: Christian Perspectives,‖ 11. 
155 John Paul II, ―Address to the Diplomatic Corps,‖ January 16, 1993; see Origins 22, no.34 (February 4, 
1993). 
156
 See Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2-The Responsibility to Protect IDPs). About national sovereignty and 
subsidiarity in the international community John Paul II states: ―But while the ‗rights of the nation‘ express the 
vital requirements of ‗particularity‘, it is no less important to emphasize the requirements of universality, 
expressed through a clear awareness of the duties which nations have vis-a-vis other nations and humanity as a 
whole. Foremost among these duties is certainly that of living in a spirit of peace, respect and solidarity with 
other nations. Thus the exercise of the rights of nations, balanced by the acknowledgment and the practice of 
duties, promotes a fruitful ‗exchange of gifts‘, which strengthens the unity of all mankind.‖ (Pope John Paul II, 
Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations, 5 October 1995. Available from: 
http://www.un.org/News/Papal/speech.txt. Accessed on 10/12/2009).  
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3.3- Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, let us state that the biblical experience of being a refugee or of 
providing forced migrants with asylum shapes the Roman Catholic Church‘s discourse on 
refugees and IDPs issues. However, this biblical experience is not universal in the sense that 
not all the other religions and peoples in the world have had the same experience as the 
people of Israel that experienced forced migration and that has developed a specific 
discourse on refugees. That is why the Judaeo-Christian discourse on refugees can 
contribute more about refugee issues in the international debate on forced migration. This 
discourse is grounded in refugees‘ experience, since being a refugee has been a fundamental 
experience both for Jews and for Christians. However, it is important to realize that the 
Bible does not provide any specific solution for the plights of refugees and IDPs today. 
Moreover, the biblical context is different from the contemporary world context where 
refugee issues have new dimensions. That is why one should be very careful in using 
examples drawn from the Bible to suggest solutions for forced migration today. 
Nevertheless, the biblical experience of refugees provides many insights and principles that 
inspire the social discourse of the Roman Catholic Church on refugees and IDPs issues. I 
have particularly underscored the following two insights and principles: 
 
1) The call for justice toward refugees: Both Old and New Testaments imply a strong 
demand for justice and compassion for aliens in general, and for refugees in particular. 
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Therefore, the international refugee protection regime should consider refugee problems as 
being a matter of justice rather than as being a matter of humanitarian relief. Yet, refugees 
and IDPs need relief, but the solutions to their plights are beyond charity and strongly 
involve commitment for justice toward forced migrants. 
 
2) Land and state reconceptualized: From the ethical perspective grounded in the 
biblical experience, the land is the land of the Lord, that is, the world belongs to God and 
humans are stewards of the world. This changes the way that Christians are supposed to be 
related to their country. They are citizens of their country; but they are also citizens of the 
world. As a result, they are supposed to be ready to share the burden and suffering of people 
of other countries in the world, and especially the suffering for those whose lives are at stake 
because of war or other threats. 
 
Thus, because the land is the land of the Lord, the world‘s wealth has a universal 
destination. The common good is not only the good of an individual nation-state; rather it is 
the good of all humanity. Accordingly, solidarity towards refugees and other forced 
migrants is a shared responsibility for all. This should be the task of advocating for refugees 
and IDPs from the perspective of the social teachings of the Catholic Church. 
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CHAPTER 4: ADVOCATING FOR REFUGEES AND IDPS IN A WORLD OF 
INCREASINGLY CLOSED BORDERS 
 
4.0- Introduction 
 
Contrary to a commonly accepted opinion that assisting refugees is a work of 
charity, this chapter on advocacy will state that refugees and IDPs issues are more about 
politics and justice than about charity and humanitarianism. That is why this chapter will 
focus on the actions of agencies that speak up for refugees to demand justice on their behalf 
through advocacy activities. In situations of internal displacement and of refugee plight, 
advocacy is an essential tool to influence decision makers and stakeholders to adopt 
practices and policies that ensure the protection of people on the move. Advocacy is, 
therefore, a central building block of most comprehensive protection strategies.  
 
However, beyond the concept of advocacy there is a variety of approaches and goals 
which differ from one another, and sometime may be in opposition. There is also a diversity 
of actors engaged in advocating on behalf of forced displaced people. From the perspective 
of this thesis on ―dignity across borders‖, I will strive to assess advocacy practices through 
the analysis of advocacy networks, their identity, the goals that they pursue, and their ways 
of working. In conclusion, I will propose the recognition of the human dignity of refugees 
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and of IDPs as an entry point for advocacy in order to ensure for them the most 
comprehensive protection in light of the Roman Catholic Church‘s social teaching. 
 
4.1- Advocacy networks for refugees and IDPs 
  
I will below identify some actors involved in advocacy for refugees and IDPs, and 
the strategies that they bring into play in their advocacy. This section will describe how 
advocacy networks for refugees and IDPs work, and how they can impact the protection of 
refugees and IDPs.  
 
4.1.1- Advocacy Activists and their Scope of Action 
 
There are a great many actors involved in advocating for refugees and IDPs. Among 
them, the UNHCR is doing a fairly good job in advocating for their protection. Since the 
UNHCR is the UN agency mandated to coordinate the Organization‘s efforts at protecting 
displaced people, advocacy is a key element in UNHCR activities. Usually, the main 
objective of UNHCR‘s advocacy is to reinforce the responsibility of State actors and 
relevant non-State actors in their efforts to protect refugees, asylum seekers, internally 
displaced people and stateless people. In its advocacy, the UNHCR refers to states and non-
state actors as ―duty-bearers,‖ because of their obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the 
rights of those whom they see as ―right-holders.‖ However, the UNHCR‘s capability of 
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advocacy is often undermined by the politicized context in which it operates and by the fact 
that it relies on states for its funding.
157
 The UNHCR advocates in cooperation with other 
UN agencies,
158
 and other partners. 
 
 Among advocacy actors for displaced people, there are also many NGOs, 
international organizations, local social movements, universities and intellectual research 
organizations, foundations, media, human rights organizations, churches, etc. These actors 
constitute the global civil society whose role is important in shaping international and 
domestic politics in matters of migration and foreign policy. Their contribution in advocacy 
for refugees and IDPs is significantly increasing in this area of contemporary international 
politics where states are no longer the only actors. Often, these non- state actors are likely to 
conduct advocacy efforts in more efficient ways than the UNHCR since they have fewer 
constraints from states in regard to their funding and programs.  
 
 Nonetheless, this variety of intergovernmental organizations and non-state actors 
does not always facilitate advocating for refugees and IDPs. This very diversity can result in 
                                               
157 Gil Loescher remarks that ―one analyst has noted that the better the High Commissioner performs the 
agency‘s protection function, the more seriously effective oversight of relief is jeopardized, since such action 
risks alienating the governments on which UNHCR depends for its budget and its permission to operate.‖ See 
Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity. International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York / Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 138. 
158 Especially the World Food Programme (WFP); the World Health Organization (WHO); the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Office of the (OHCHR); etc. 
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opposition between advocacy actors. As a lobbyist reported: ―You have to figure nearly 
every issue has an opponent. So, you‘re advocating one thing, another person is advocating 
another thing.‖159 Whereas some organizations advocate for opened-borders for refugees, 
others are advocating for closed-borders in order to keep refugees out while being willing to 
provide them with relief on the condition that they stay or return to their country of 
citizenship. Forced-migration or migrations in general, constitute a delicate question which 
involves emotions and contradictory ideologies even among people of good will. How do 
advocacy activists operate? 
 
4.1.2- Advocacy Strategies 
 
 Advocacy activists for forced displaced people operate differently in accordance 
with their scale of values, ideology, or spirituality. They, therefore, bring into play 
heterogeneity of strategies. Nevertheless, whatever methods of advocacy are applied, 
activists usually resort to some basic strategies which include networking, information 
gathering, campaigns, and lobbying. Given that refugee issues arise in very complex 
sociopolitical situations, networking is, therefore, important, for it is difficult for a single 
organization or activist to impact the context for a better protection of refugees and IDPs. 
That is why M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink state that: ―To influence discourse, procedures, and 
                                               
159 Woodstock Theological Center, Ethics in Public Policy Program, The Ethics of Lobbying: Organized 
Interests, Political Power, and the Common Good (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 
23. 
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policy, activists may engage and become part of larger policy communities that group actors 
working on an issue from a variety of institutional and value perspectives.‖160 
 
Refugee advocacy networks are communicative structures that help to gather 
information and in order to put pressure on states or non-state actors which are responsible 
for the refugee crisis or which can improve the situation of refugees and IDPs. For example, 
the Jesuit Refugee Service engaged in Columbia advocates against the use of child soldiers 
in conflicts which drive out many people. In order to increase the chance of success of its 
advocacy, this organization joined a coalition of other organizations which are not always 
working explicitly on refugee issues but which are in opposition to the use of child soldiers. 
This coalition, known as The Spanish Coalition against the Use of Child Soldiers, urged 
―the [Spanish] government, in its role as Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
to put pressure on the Colombian government and illegally armed groups so as to implement 
the UN recommendations regarding the involvement of children in armed conflicts.‖161 
Therefore, advocacy for refugees and IDPs is very much a question of building coalitions on 
specific issues related to refugees and IDPs. Refugee advocacy networks empower members 
by gathering and sharing information.  
At the core of the relationship [of advocacy network] is information exchange. What is novel 
in these networks, wrote Keck and Sikkink, is the ability of nontraditional international 
actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories to 
                                               
160 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), 3. 
161 See Jesuit Refugee Service, available from http://www.jrs.net/news/index.php?lang=en&sid=5258; Internet; 
accessed on 02/17/2010. 
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persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and 
governments. Activists in networks try not only to influence policy outcomes, but to 
transform the terms and nature of the debate. They are not always successful in their efforts, 
but they are increasingly relevant players in policy debates.162 
For instance, most of the information on the crisis of forced displaced people of Darfur in 
Sudan comes from NGOs and advocacy networks. By creating or influencing public opinion 
on a particular refugee issue, these advocacy networks develop a ―soft power‖ which can 
become compelling in policy making or in addressing refugee crises. 
 
Sometimes, it is not enough to broadcast strategic information about forced displaced 
people. Advocacy network activist have to undertake fierce campaigns which involve legal 
procedures, denunciation of rights violations, or suggest solutions. Campaigns are organized 
procedures to promote causes: ―Activists identify a problem, specify a cause, and propose a 
solution, all with an eye toward producing procedural, substantive, and normative change in 
their area of concern.‖163 Usually, as a method of advocacy, a campaign includes lobbying164 
to gain the trust of major actors who have the power of decision making on a precise issue. 
Sometimes, a campaign can be seen as an aggressive way of advocating. That is why some 
organizations like the UNHCR are reserved in their use of this method of ―hard 
                                               
162 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, 2. 
163 Ibid., 8. 
164 About lobbying as a tool of public advocacy and about lobbyists work in the USA, see the study published 
by Woodstock Theological Center, Ethics in Public Policy Program, The Ethics of Lobbying: Organized 
Interests, Political Power, and the Common Good (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002). 
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advocacy.‖165 According to the UNHCR, “soft advocacy activities, such as awareness-
raising, training activities and quiet diplomacy, are usually the preferred option to persuade 
stakeholders to introduce change or expand the use of good practices for the protection of 
IDPs [and refugees].‖166 Whatever strategies are employed, the success of an advocacy 
effort relies on its capability to put pressure on targeted actors who have the power to end or 
alleviate a given refugee crisis.  
 
4.2- Advocacy activists should keep in mind that there is no typical 
response to refugee and IDP issues 
 
Even though the above section showed how advocacy networks contribute to solve 
forced migration issues, it is important, paradoxically, to acknowledge that there is no 
typical response to the issues of refugees and IDPs. This is the lesson learned from the 
ground up by many humanitarian organizations and practitioners who have been forced to 
                                               
165 According to the UNHCR, ―Hard advocacy, consisting of stronger persuasion methods such as public 
reports, press releases, personal testimonies and denunciation letters, even if confidential, should be used when 
a stronger approach is required. It can be effective in denouncing corruption, discrimination or harmful 
treatment of IDPs and the other affected populations. The use of hard advocacy should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. It could disrupt dialogue with key stakeholders, prompt a denial of humanitarian access to 
vital areas, or heighten the risks to the affected populations or humanitarian staff. The decision should thus be 
carefully weighed against the urgency and seriousness of the protection concerns. If it is determined that hard 
advocacy should be used, do so in a timely manner, before the situation becomes too grave or the damage done 
is irreparable.‖ See UNHCR, Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Part IV: Activities 
and Tools for Protection. Guidance Notes [book on-line] (Geneva: UNHCR, December 1st, 2007), 105; 
available from: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4794a3012&query=ACTIVITIES%20AND%20TOOLS%20FOR%2
0PROTECTION; Internet; accessed 02/18/2010.  
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acknowledge the complexity and the uniqueness of each refugee plight and of each refugee 
as a person. For example, in assessing its commitment with refugees and IDPs, the Jesuit 
Refugee Service (JRS) remarked: 
Since JRS was set up, the profile and needs of the world‘s displaced people have undergone 
several changes. There is no typical refugee, just as there is no classic, formulated response. 
JRS workers implement a vast range of services depending on the needs of those they serve 
and on prevalent circumstances.167 
 
As a result, there should be no shortcut in dealing with situations such as plights of 
refugees and IDPs where human dignity is at stake. Although the causes of refugee plights 
are known, the ways to address them differ from one situation to another. The reason for this 
is that each refugee or group of refugees is often, if not always, particular and in need of a 
specific response. That is why, operating in the ever-changing world of forced migration, 
people and organizations who are involved in advocacies and reliefs are called to be forever 
flexible and open to new challenges and to new responses. That is why advocacy efforts on 
behalf of refugees and IDPs should avoid ―top-down solutions‖. Thus, it is more about doing 
things with refugees and IDPs than doing things for them. They should participate in any 
decision that concerns them. That is to say, any action for refugees and IDPs should be 
preceded by a dialogue that takes into account their opinion and desire. As Mark Raper, a 
former Director of JRS, wrote:  
Our biggest temptation, on seeing the distress of the refugees in Karagwe or Fungnido Camp 
or in a city like Johannesburg or Nairobi, is to begin projects, to give material things, to 
decide en masse what the refugees need. They often arrive in exile without shoes, with only 
                                               
167 JRS, God in Exile. Towards a Shared Spirituality with Refugees (Rome: Jesuit Refugee Service, 2005), 9. 
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one torn shirt, hungry, without a clear plan. But they did not undergo this experience in order 
to get a shirt or shoes. Their human experience is to be respected.168  
 
That is why the task of any advocacy for refugees and IDPs begins by listening 
carefully to their needs before undertaking any action
169
. In other words, advocacy should be 
undertaken from the interests of refugees and IDPs and not from the perspective of the 
―experts‖ of humanitarian organizations. I agree with Peter Van Arsdale who argues that it is 
the ―felt needs‖170 of refugees and IDPs that should determine the hierarchy of problems to 
be addressed and the assistance protocol to be implemented, and not the expressed need of 
service personnel, agencies, donors, or policy makers on behalf of the beneficiaries.
171
  
 
However, acting from the felt needs of refugees does not undermine the importance 
of experts and humanitarian practitioners. Drawing from my experience of attending to the 
needs of refugees in Kenya, I can state that refugees don‘t always have a clear idea of their 
needs and of what can be objectively done for them. In fact, many refugees are 
psychologically unstable because of the trauma of war and violence that they have witnessed 
and suffered. That is why their ―felt needs‖ need to be discussed by experts and 
                                               
168 Jesuit Refugee Service, Everybody’s Challenge. Essential Documents of Jesuit Refugee Service. 1980-2000 
(Rome: Jesuit Refugee Service, 2000), 87. 
169 See B.S. Chimni, ―Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model,‖ Journal of Refugee 
Studies14, no.2 (2001): 151-168. See also Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency 
(New York, London: Routledge, 2006), 126-131. 
170 According to Van Arsdale, ―felt needs are those needs emically derived, which from the beneficiaries‘ 
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Arsdale, Forced to Flee: Human Rights and Human Wrongs in Refugee Homelands (Lanham, Boolder, New 
York: Lexington Books, 2006), 187. 
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practitioners.
172
 The point of my argument is that advocacies for forced displaced people 
should be grounded in a bottom-up approach which emanates from the viewpoint of 
refugees themselves and not in a top-down approach where refugees‘ voices are not always 
heard and taken into account.
173
 Since there is no typical response that works for refugees in 
any given circumstance, the best way to find a solution for each particular refugee plight is 
to look for a consensus that takes into account both the opinion of refugees and the opinion 
of experts and humanitarian practitioners. From this stance, what constitutes the proper aims 
of advocacies on behalf of refugees and IDPs? 
 
4.3- The aim of Advocating for Refugees and IDPs from the 
perspective of their human dignity 
 
My argument will be that any advocacy for refugees and IDPs should aim at ensuring 
their human dignity. What does it mean to ensure human dignity to refugees and IDPs? As I 
have already explained,
174
 human dignity is a broad notion that expresses human worthiness 
                                               
172 See JRS, Everybody’s Challenge, 88. 
173 The bottom-up approach is implemented by many organizations including UNHCR, JRS, Oxfam. 
According to Peter Nyers, ―Oxfam (GB), for example, has recently made it a priority to listen to the forcibly 
displaced people to whom they provide aid and development assistance. Accordingly, the organization 
commissioned a report, entitled ‗Listening to the Displaced,‘ with the aim of developing a methodology of how 
to listen to displaced people in conflict situations. The ostensible purpose of this exercise is to ―empower‖ 
people living in crisis situations to have input into formulating the solution to their plight. This would allow 
Oxfam (GB) to respond to humanitarian emergencies in a way that avoids ‗top-down solutions that do not 
always take the opinion of the displaced refugees into account‘.‖ See Peter Nyers, Forced to Flee, 127. See 
also the bottom-up approach implemented by Jesuit Refugee Service, in JRS, Everybody’s Challenge, 86-88. 
174 See the definition of the notion of ―human dignity‖ in chapter 1 (section 1.3- Research object and main 
concepts). 
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as a fundamental value derived from the fact that the human person is created in the image 
of God and born of human beings. I have also explained how it can be risky to reduce 
human dignity to a specific quality such as reason, freedom, etc. From this point of view, 
advocating for refugees and IDPs will consist in undertaking everything that contributes to 
help them to lead a dignified life. Since there is no typical response to refugee issues, 
advocacy activists should strive through discernment and listening to forced migrants in 
order to find what can be the right response and what means lead to a dignified life in a 
particular refugee plight. 
 
 As a result, advocacies should not be limited to providing refugees and IDPs with 
―minimum standards‖ which refer to the basic necessities that are required for the survival 
of a person. These basic necessities of life include physical safety, food, shelter and basic 
sanitary and health facilities.
175
 Yet, ensuring basic needs is very important and it constitutes 
the principal goal of many humanitarian organizations that work with refugees and IDPs. 
However, as Judy Mayotte states rightfully: ―From the first moment a refugee crosses a 
border, he or she needs food and shelter – this is relief. But from that moment, each refugee 
                                               
175 An official report of the UNHCR acknowledges that ―the term ‗minimum standards‘ does not have an 
official UNHCR definition; however, it is usually taken to mean the basic protection and assistance standards 
laid out in the Handbook for Emergencies. These standards are absolute and, if not met, will seriously affect a 
person‘s health and could lead to death.‖ See United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees, Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis Unit, Minimum standards and essential needs in a protracted refugee situation: A review of 
the UNHCR programme in Kakuma, Kenya (Geneva: UNHCR, EPAU/2000/05, November 2000), 3. See also 
the United Nation High Commisioner for Refugees, Handbook of Emergencies (Geneva:  UNHCR, 2nd Edition, 
2000), 14. 
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needs much more.‖176 Refugees and IDPs are not only mouths to feed or bodies to shelter. 
They did not undergo this experience in order to get a shirt, shoes, food, and health facilities, 
etc.
177
 This is why advocacy activists should move quickly beyond the task of providing 
forced migrants with basic necessities. From this perspective, for example, the UNHCR 
conducted a study in Kenya according to which providing minimum standards should no 
longer be the goal of a given UNHCR intervention, and the organization should focus on 
essential needs. The difference between minimum standards and essential needs is that the 
former is static while the latter is dynamic and is well positioned to be responsive and 
adjustable to the needs of refugees and IDPs. As the study explained: 
This report argues that when planning refugee operations, UNHCR should think in terms of 
essential needs rather than minimum standards. Essential needs are those elements required 
to lead a safe and dignified life. They both comprise and go beyond minimum standards, and 
are time and context elastic. While at the start of an emergency essential needs may be 
congruent with minimum standards, over time essential needs will grow, as refugee lives 
become increasingly intolerable unless they are able to enjoy a wider range of human rights, 
and are enabled to develop their human functions and capabilities. Eventually, a refugee 
situation becomes incompatible with, and obstructive of, the enjoyment of such rights, and a 
durable solution is ultimately required in order to enable refugees to aspire to such a state.178 
 
Whatever the appellation of ―essential needs‖ or another appellation, advocacies 
which aim at ensuring human dignity to refugees and IDPs should encompass a wide range 
of activities and should never be static since the world of refugees and IDPs is a changing 
one. This does not mean that all advocacy activists should be engaged in all the issues 
related to forced migrants; that would be illusory since they are unlikely to have 
                                               
176 Judy A. Mayotte, Disposable People? The Plight of Refugees (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 
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177 See Jesuit Refugee Service, Everybody’s Challenge, 87. 
178 United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Minimum standards 
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competencies, knowledge, and means to advocate for all the issues. The point of the 
argument is that advocacy activists should be aware that solutions at a particular moment in 
the lives of a particular refugee group can later hinder their development. That is why even 
emergency situations should not only be focused on immediate relief; they should open 
doors, in the long-term, to durable solutions. The UNHCR is wise to state that:  
From the outset of an emergency, UNHCR must bear in mind the ultimate objective of 
refugee protection: to help refugees to overcome displacement and achieve a solution 
whereby national protection is re-established and they will no longer be refugees.179 
 
In sum, whatever the content and the field of any advocacy for refugees and IDPs, 
the aim should always be to enable them, in the long-term, to no longer be refugees and to 
enjoy their human dignity. Therefore, before undertaking any action or when assessing 
policies and actions, any advocacy should critically answer this question: ―To what extent 
does this particular action or policy enable refugees or IDPs, in the long-term, to lead a 
dignified life?‖ This question implies a variety of responses and methods of advocacy that I 
would like to assess in the next section. 
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4.4- Assessments and Prospects of Practices of Advocacies for 
Refugees and IDPs from the perspective of human rights 
  
Currently advocacies for refugees and IDPs are grounded on human rights. There is a 
certain agreement among scholars and human rights activists that ―advocacy will be more 
effective if it is grounded in the fundamental human rights of displaced persons.‖180 
However, there is a variety of approaches to advocacy that are all motivated by human rights 
principles. I will assess only a few of them, namely the welfarist approach, the legalistic 
approach, the capability-based approach, and the recognition-based approach. 
 
4.4.1- Welfare-based approach advocacy 
 
The welfare-based approach advocacies are usually focused on short-term 
emergency aid such as the distribution of food and shelter kits, tents, blankets, and hygienic 
articles, etc. They aim at providing displaced people with means that help them to meet 
humanitarian standards in relation to nutrition, food security and public health. Welfare-
based advocacies make an important contribution in saving lives and in improving the well-
being of displaced people. Their actions are concrete and more visible since they are often 
given publicity in the media. For example, welfare-based advocacies activists are the ones 
                                               
180 David Hollenbach, ―Human Rights as an Ethical Framework for Advocacy,‖ in Refugee Rights: Ethics, 
Advocacy, and Africa, ed. David Hollenbach (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 3. 
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most often pictured among humanitarian activists; and they are often shown distributing 
relief to forcibly displaced people. From this point of view, welfare-based advocacies 
embody humanitarian assistance.  
 
This category of activism enjoys the advantage of providing services that are 
quantitatively measurable by means of statistics that provide indicators of protection gaps, 
and serve as a measure of the impact of assistance activities. For example, since 2005, the 
UNHCR has launched an annual report entitled ―Measuring Protection by Numbers‖ which 
aims ―to illustrate, primarily by numbers, the state of international protection measured 
through the programmes both of UNHCR and its partners.‖181  Moreover, since their results 
are statistically measurable in terms of number of people nourished, or number of shelters 
distributed, and so forth, welfare-based advocacies are more likely to gain the support of 
donors who are pleased to receive data which shows what their money has helped to 
achieve.  
 
Nevertheless, welfare-based advocacies face some limits. Loren Landau warns that 
―despite its value, there is a danger that such welfarist approaches ultimately treat people as 
                                               
181 See UNHCR, Measuring Protection by Numbers, December 2006 [Journal on-line]; available from: 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4579701b2&query=Measuring%20 
Protection%20by%20Numbers; Internet; accessed 02/15/2010. 
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sites of action or as outputs.‖182  In fact, welfarist approaches are more focused on 
assistance; they are less concerned about protection. That is why Roberta Cohen criticizes 
such approaches when she remarks that:  
Providing food, medicine, and shelter to internally displaced persons, while ignoring violent 
abuse, has led to the tragic description of the victims as the ―well-fed dead.‖ The expression 
may have originated in Bosnia in the 1990s, but it also applies to Darfur where there are 
more than 11,000 humanitarian workers on the ground, but fewer than one hundred with 
protection responsibilities.
183
 
 
From the perspective of this reflection on ―dignity across borders‖, welfare-based 
approaches are to be complemented by other approaches which include the rights of 
refugees and IDPs, and the recognition of their dignity as human beings and not as ―well-fed 
dead‖. 
 
4.4.2- Legalistic approach advocacies 
 
While welfare-based advocacies are focused on humanitarian assistance, legal 
advocacies encompass both humanitarian assistance and a strong commitment to the rights 
of refugees and IDPs. The complex nature of refugee plights has highlighted the close 
relationship between refugee law, human rights and international humanitarian law. Legal 
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advocacy activists refer to this broad body of law.184 Even though the international legal 
framework for the protection of IDPs is still embryonic,185 it is important to acknowledge 
that, from the human rights perspective, there is an impressive array of universal, regional 
and domestic human rights instruments and mechanisms which can be employed to enhance 
the protection of refugees and asylum seekers as well as of IDPs. 
 
Legalistic approach advocacies strive to bring states and non-states actors to 
implement these legal rights that refugees are entitled to. One of the most frequent actions of 
legal advocacy activists consists in making refugees and IDPs‘ rights known. They assume 
that refugees and IDPs will be better protected if the conditions that impede or promote their 
rights are better understood through careful social and political analysis.186  Consequently, 
they undertake many initiatives at the international, regional and national levels that aim at 
building up the expertise and resources of national judicial bodies, civic entities and civil 
society. For instance, they organize workshops; run training programs and other activities to 
inform forcibly displaced people and stakeholders about rights and duties to which displaced 
people are entitled. 
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Legalistic approach advocacy activists are also engaged in campaigns against states 
and non-state actors that violate the rights of refugees and IDPs. Their actions are very 
important in denouncing violations both in the sending countries that generate plights of 
refugees and IDPs, and in the host countries that do not implement treaties and conventions 
related to the protection of refugees. Today, more than ever, legal advocacy activists are 
involved in a fierce battle to ensure protection to refugees in view of the fact that an 
increasing number of states are unwilling to offer asylum to them. Brian Gorlick rightly 
depicted the uneasy legal context that refugees face as follow: 
Refugees in the world today, although growing in numbers in recent years, are swiftly losing 
ground in terms of legal protection provided by a number of states. Many states that have 
subscribed to the international legal regime of refugee protection by acceding to the 
international refugee instruments are currently undertaking radical changes through 
legislative and inter-state arrangements which result in restricting access to asylum and the 
provision of legal rights to refugees. These restrictions include, notably but not exclusively, 
limiting access to refugee status determination procedures and employing an increasingly 
restrictive interpretation of the refugee definition. This trend has been described as ‗a pull 
back from the legal foundation on which effective protection rests.‘
187
 
 
In this context, legal advocacies have a significant potential impact on the lives of 
refugees and IDPs so that even other approaches to advocacy have to integrate legal 
dimensions of protection for them. From this standpoint, I agree with Bateman who thinks 
that even though some advocacy can be performed successfully using good negotiation 
skills, without relying on the law or other rules, it is not advisable. Bateman consistently 
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recommends establishing whether there is a legal case before commencing negotiations or 
any other active advocacy.
188
 Unlike welfare-based advocacies that usually appeal to 
generosity and to charity in order to provide assistance to displaced people, legalistic 
approach advocacies consider the protection of refugees and IDPs much more as a matter of 
justice than as a matter of charity. Although accurate as far as it goes, this standpoint of 
justice and law nevertheless creates conflicts since states and even donors are usually 
reluctant to be compelled by law to protect refugees.
189
 In this context, Gil Loescher warns 
that, 
the better the High Commissioner performs the agency‘s protection function [which involves 
legal processes], the more seriously effective oversight of relief is jeopardized, since such 
action risks alienating the governments on which UNHCR depends for its budget and its 
permission to operate… No refugee agency can simultaneously be independent for the 
purpose of protection and dependent for the purpose of relief.190 
 
In this highly politicized context, legalistic approach advocacies will have to operate 
with subtlety and diplomacy. Since there is no supranational authority to enforce the rules 
and laws of the international refugee regime, legal arguments to compel states will not be 
fully effective. Starting with justice seems not to be realistic in regards to the international 
regime of refugee protection and the nature of the international community. Legal advocacy 
for refugees should therefore find diplomatic ways and means to integrate harmoniously 
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both a discourse based on justice and law, and a discourse based on charity, compassion, and 
responsibility. 
 
4.4.3- Capability-based approach advocacies 
 
The capability-based approach is drawn from the work of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum. However, in this reflection, I will limit my analysis to Sen‘s understanding of 
capability. Before outlining how the capability approach informs advocacy for refugees and 
IDPs, it is worthwhile to understand Sen‘s anthropological thought, which encompasses two 
main concepts: agency and well-being.  Agency designates the freedom to lead the life that 
one has reason to value. In other words, capability refers to the various alternatives ―beings 
and doings‖ that a person can achieve with his economic, social, and personal 
characteristics. Well-being is a self-explanatory concept. For Sen, being well or having well-
being is not something outside the person and that the person can command. Having well-
being is, rather, something in the person and that the person achieves
191
. Agency and well-
being are two related concepts and they should not be dissociated so that each person ought 
to become the agent of his/her own well-being. To be an agent of one‘s own well-being 
means to be ―someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be 
judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of 
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some external criteria as well.‖192 From this standpoint, ―development consists of the 
removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choices and little 
opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency.‖193  
 
Sen‘s capability approach, when applied to refugees as Loren Landau194 did, aims at 
not only ensuring the basic needs of refugees, but also at expanding their agency that 
consists of their ability to choose different ways of living. In this perspective, advocating for 
the protection of refugees and IDPs consists in advocating for their development or well-
being. In other words, it means taking actions in order to free refugees and IDPs from all 
obstacles which hinder their capability to choose the type of life that they are eager to lead. 
Capability-based approach advocacy goes beyond minimum protection standards or beyond 
basic capabilities,
195
 and is aimed at providing forced displaced people with ―the bases for 
the achievement of higher-order capabilities linked to personal fulfillment and the 
realization of people‘s human dignity.‖196 Since capability-based approach advocacy targets 
the improvement of capabilities and opportunities so that one may become self-agent of 
one‘s own development, this approach is therefore a critique of the so-called dependency 
syndrome associated with the refugee assistance provided in camps. According to Landau,  
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The capability approach, by emphasizing the need to ensure refugees have the right to choice 
and to control their own environments, helps to avoid a kind of commodity fetishism [that is, 
too much focus on commodities] characteristic of many humanitarian programs and welfarist 
treatments of assistance.197  
 
Overall, the capability approach to advocacy is interesting and encompasses almost 
all the important dimensions of protection that refugees and IDPs need in order to lead a 
dignified life. This approach develops principles that aim to empower refugees and IDPs. 
Therefore, the capability approach is based heavily on power and politics. Conversely, I find 
this lens of power through which the capability approach deals with forced displaced issues 
is somewhat reductionist, and may not be the best foundation for grounding protection of 
forced displaced people. I agree with Maureen Junker-Kenny‘s critique of one approach to 
the capability approach when she remarked that ―if one chooses ‗power‘ as the bottom line, 
the danger is that every phenomenon gets reduced to it. Politics becomes the fine-tuning of 
this accepted state of human affairs.‖198 Consequently, I would like to suggest the 
―recognition approach‖ which encompasses the capability approach. But unlike the 
capability approach, it is not based on power; rather it is grounded in the principle of human 
dignity which offers a more fundamental approach from a Christian ethics perspective.  
 
                                               
197 Ibid., 105. 
198 Maureen Junker-Kenny, ―Arguing for a humanity of Equals: From Capabilities to Recognition,‖ in 
Negotiating Borders. Theological Explorations in the Global Era. Essays in Honour of Prof. Felix Wilfred, ed. 
Patrick Gnanapragasam and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (Delhi: ISPCK, 2008), 244. 
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4.5- Recognition-based advocacy as a comprehensive approach to 
advocacy from the perspective of human dignity 
 
The concept of recognition is elastic. Therefore, it opens doors to many 
interpretations
199
. That is why there are many philosophies of recognition.
200
 However, I will 
ground this reflection on Paul Ricoeur‘s philosophy of recognition as exposed in The Course 
of Recognition.
201
 Ricoeur attributes three meanings or functions to the concept of 
recognition: identifying objects, attesting to one‘s own capacity for responsible agency, and 
establishing mutual understanding in social relationships.
202
 For the purpose of this study, I 
will only focus my analysis on the latter two meanings since the first one refers to the 
identification of objects. I will strive to suggest how Ricoeur‘s understanding of recognition 
can be an entry point to advocacy.  
 
                                               
199 For more comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the concept of recognition, see Christian Lazzeri and 
Alain Caillé, ―Recognition Today: The Theoretical, Ethical and Political Stakes of the Concept,‖ Critical 
Horizon 7, no 1 (2006): 63-100. 
200 For more details about the variety of philosophies of recognition, see for instance: Axel Honneth, The 
Struggle of Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge, MA: 
Polity Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989); J. Habermas, ―The Struggle for Recognition in the Democratic State,‖ in The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. C. Cronin and P. De Greif (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1998).  
201 Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005). 
202 Each of these three functions constitutes a chapter of Ricoeur‘s book: The Course of Recognition. 
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4.5.1- The concept of recognition 
 
According to Ricoeur, recognition as ―recognizing oneself‖203 does not mean finding 
one‘s identity. Rather it means recognizing one‘s self through the acknowledging of one‘s 
own capacities, and namely the specifically human capacities to act and to suffer.
204
 For 
Ricoeur, what one recognizes in oneself is those characteristics which one shares with other 
people. Recognizing oneself does not refer, therefore, to those characteristics which make 
one particular, or which define one‘s particular identity. In other words, recognition as 
recognizing oneself means discovering what makes up our common humanity. Or, from the 
Roman Catholic social teachings perspective, recognizing oneself means recognizing that 
one belongs to the same human family. This perspective is interesting for advocating for 
refugees since recognizing oneself is not focused on identity characteristics that divide us 
such as ethnic identity, citizenship, etc. It is important to underscore that even though 
recognition as recognizing oneself encompasses self-consciousness, self-knowledge, self-
esteem, and self-attestation, it has a fundamental social aspect. According to Ricoeur, ―this 
self-recognition requires, at each step, the help of others.‖205 That is why Christian Lazzeri 
and Alain Caillé contend: 
If recognition therefore simultaneously comprises a dimension of social integration and 
social approval, it can be maintained that self-esteem represents the subjective translation of 
the act of recognition. We can thus complete the proposition and say that the recognition that 
                                               
203 This constitutes the title of the second chapter of Ricoeur‘s book: The Course of Recognition. See pp.69-
149. 
204 Ibid., 69. See also the commentary by Julie Connolly, ―Charting a Course for Recognition: a Review 
Essay,‖ History of the Human Sciences 20, no.1 (2007): 137. 
205 Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 69. 
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others grant the agent, contributes both to the creation of the value of her project, and to the 
formation of the feeling of confidence in her ability to realize them successfully.206 
 
 Thus, recognition as recognizing oneself leads to the other lever of recognition as 
―mutual recognition.‖207 Following Axel Honneth, Paul Ricoeur distinguishes three forms of 
mutual recognition. The first is based on love and it is ―constituted by strong emotional 
attachments among a small number of people.‖208 This first level of mutual recognition is a 
pre-juridical form of reciprocal recognition where ―subjects mutually conﬁrm each other 
with regard to their concrete needs and thereby recognize each other as needy creatures.‖209 
This prejuridical level ensures a kind of mutual approbation and self-confidence. 
Humiliation is the contrary of such a level of mutual approbation:  
Humiliation, experienced as the withdrawal or refusal of such approbation, touches everyone 
at the prejuridical level of his or her ―being-with‖ others. The individual feels looked down 
on from above, even taken as insigniﬁcant. Deprived of approbation, the person is as if 
nonexistent.210  
 
 The second form of mutual recognition is rights-based recognition.
211
 This form of 
recognition is wider than love-based recognition since it can be generalized at the level of a 
society. This juridical level of mutual recognition means universal respect; and it is 
institutionalized in legal recognition of rights that everyone can claim. However, recognition 
of one‘s rights is equivalent to recognition of one‘s responsibility toward other people. For, 
                                               
206 Christian Lazzeri and Alain Caillé, ―Recognition Today: The Theoretical, Ethical and Political Stakes of the 
Concept,‖ Critical Horizon 7, no 1 (2006): 69. 
207 This is the title of third chapter of Ricoeur‘s The Course of Recognition, 150-246. 
208 Axel Honneth quoted by P. Ricoeur in The Course of Recognition, 188. 
209 Axel Honneth quoted by P. Ricoeur in The Course of Recognition, 189. 
210 Ibid., 191. 
211 Ibid., 196-201. 
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―Juridical recognition can also be characterized in the following terms: ‗We can only come 
to understand ourselves as the bearers of rights when we know, in turn, what various 
normative obligations we must keep vis-à-vis others‘.‖212  
 
The third form of mutual recognition is social esteem
213
 which ―functions to sum up 
all the modes of mutual recognition that exceed the mere recognition of the equality of rights 
among free subjects.‖214 It refers to prestige or social consideration, not in a selfish way, but 
rather in an altruistic way since social esteem is the recognition by people of ―the 
importance of their individual qualities for the life of others.‖215 How can Ricoeur‘s 
understanding of recognition be helpful for advocating for refugees and IDPs? 
 
4.5.2- The task of recognition-based advocacy 
 
At the level of recognition as ―recognizing oneself‖, advocacy will have to develop 
strategies in order to expand a kind of cosmopolitan view which prioritizes our common 
humanity across borders over considerations of our national identity. In other words, the 
leitmotif for a recognition-based advocacy could be this phrase: ―Refugees are like us‖, or 
―refugees share the same humanity with us.‖ This will create a strong sense of common 
                                               
212 Ibid., 197. 
213 Ibid., 201-216. 
214 Ibid., 202. 
215 Ibid. 
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humanity between humans across national borders, or across non-geographical borders such 
as ethnic or religious identities, etc. In fact, I think one of the most important difficulties that 
refugees face is that they are often categorized and set apart through laws and other 
particular status so that finally they appear to be different from the citizens of the countries 
in which they live. For example, the confinements to camps are some of these practices that 
can lead one to consider refugees as being different from us in humanity.
216
 My point is that, 
if one should ―recognize oneself‖ through what one shares with all humanity, therefore 
refugees would have a better chance to receive treatment which would acknowledge their 
dignity as humans. Refugee crisis would therefore no longer be considered as being only a 
humanitarian issue, or a security issue, or a political issue. While refugees and IDPs suffer 
from all these issues, they should not be reduced to them.  
 
At the level of mutual recognition, a recognition-based advocacy will emphasize the 
fundamental solidarity which links all humans across borders. Either based on love, rights, 
or social esteem, mutual recognition improves social relationships and creates real 
international community where people care for one another since they share the same 
destiny. Mutual recognition improves, therefore, the humanity of all. As Pope John Paul II 
states, ―to be human means to be called to interpersonal communion.‖217 The more people 
develop a strong consciousness of their interpersonal communion, the more likely they will 
                                               
216 See David Hollenbach, ―Human Rights as an Ethical Framework for Advocacy,‖ in Refugee Rights: Ethics, 
Advocacy, and Africa, ed. David Hollenbach (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 3. 
217 John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem, 7: AAS 80 (1988), 1666. 
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attend the needy among them such as refugees and IDPs. For it is the bonds that unite the 
human family ―which must ultimately inspire our solidarity.‖218 
 
4.6- Conclusion 
 
Finally, the task of advocating for refugees and IDPs from the perspective of the 
social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church consists in the recognition of their dignity. 
However, recognition as a point of entry for advocacy does not suggest a specific task to be 
undertaken. Above all, from a more fundamental and moral standpoint, it suggests a way of 
dealing with forced migrants‘ issues which prioritizes their humanity. A recognition-based 
approach suggests spirituality, a way of being with refugees and IDPs which also informs 
the way of doing things for forced migrants. Before capabilities and rights there is 
recognition, the desire to be recognized as a human. The recognition of the human dignity of 
refugees and IDPs clears the ground for their rights and capability-building. For, rights and 
capabilities result from a process of recognition given that recognition is, at the same time, 
attestation of responsibility for ―the Other‖.219 That is why the recognition approach goes 
farther than the other approaches to advocacy, and it is likely to embody Roman Catholic 
social teachings on human dignity and protection of refugees and IDPs. 
                                               
218 John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 40: AAS 80 (1988), 569. 
219 See the Ethics of responsibility for ―the Other‖ developed by Emmanuel Levinas in Entre nous: Thinking-
Of-The-Other, translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000).  
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CHAPTER 5: FINAL CONCLUSION: DIGNITY ACROSS BORDERS 
 
The purpose of this reflection – Dignity across Borders: Rethinking the Protection of 
Refugees and IDPs from an Ethical Perspective – has been to challenge contemporary ways 
of thinking and dealing with issues related to refugees and IDPs. Today, refugees and IDPs 
are often reduced to their needs. They are often perceived as bodies to shelter, to heal or to 
clothe; mouths to feed; victims of persecution to protect, etc. In the same perspective, 
contemporary debates on treatments of refugees and IDPs tend to rotate around the financial 
costs of processing claims, social security benefits for asylum seekers, and social tensions 
arising from the presence of large numbers of refugees and IDPs in receiving countries or 
communities. While acknowledging the importance of all these issues and needs, the stance 
of this reflection has been to refocus the debate on the concept of human dignity which 
transcends borders such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, race, etc. From this standpoint, the 
debate changes and gains more fundamental and moral depths. 
 
This reflection has shown how the international legal concept of refugee is related to 
state boundaries so that if there were no nation-state system, if we lived in a world without 
borders, there would be no refugees. States, therefore, play an important role in conferring 
the status of refugee, and in providing legal protection as well as authorizing actors to deal 
with refugees and IDPs within national territory. This reflection has also shown how the 
consideration of the human dignity of refugees and IDPs relativizes the state and its 
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sovereignty within national borders. The dignity and the integrity of the individual 
regardless of his/her citizenship are recognized as essential values from which has emerged 
an international human rights regime. The ascendance of human rights-based principles in 
international relations and politics tends to re-conceptualize state sovereignty as 
responsibility toward individuals and peoples within and beyond national borders. Unlike 
political, social, and civil rights which are predicated on the distinction between national and 
alien, human rights are not dependant on nationality. That is why I argued that helping states 
to implement human rights will improve the international refugee protection regime.  
 
Moreover, human rights-based principles and guidelines are not opposed to the 
nation-state insofar as many of them have been elaborated or approved by nation-states. For 
that reason, using them to make claims for a new global refugee protection regime does not 
mean necessarily fighting against governments. There will be no significant improvement of 
the situation facing refugees and IDPs without the contribution of states as political entities. 
Even though these human rights-based principles and laws aim at a kind of cosmopolitan 
world society, national borders will still be important. And one cannot expect host countries 
to receive all those who are asylum-seekers. However, one of the arguments of this thesis is 
that states can do better than what has been accomplished so far in finding solutions for the 
crisis facing refugees and IDPs. Solutions should result from overlapping efforts of states, 
NGOs, churches, universities, etc., in seeking the good for refugees and IDPs in relation to 
the common good of the globalizing society.  
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From the same stance, but grounded in the biblical experience, the Roman Catholic 
Church‘s social discourse on refugees and IDPs challenges the actual international refugee 
protection regime. Because all are created in the image and likeness of God, all humans 
share the same dignity. Their dignity and their rights as humans are not related to their 
citizenship, but to the fact that they have been born into a human family. This is the 
foundation of Christian universalism that challenges the current refugee protection regime 
that is based on the membership of states. Yet, Christian universalism is also a realism that 
respects the state sovereignty within its borders. Conversely, the main claim of Catholic 
social teachings on refugee issues is that the refugee issues should not be perceived only 
from the standpoint of the state, such as national security concern and borders control. 
Above all, refugees should be perceived as human beings, as dignities across borders. This 
should be the task of advocating for refugees and IDPs from the perspective of the social 
teachings of the Catholic Church. 
 
In sum, the issues surrounding the needs of refugees and IDPs are huge. While 
acknowledging the importance of numerous programs and actors who strive to provide a 
variety of responses to the crises of refugees and IDPs, the aim of this study has been to 
underscore how beyond the needs of refugees and IDPs, there is a demand to recognize them 
as human beings. I agree with Swiss Federal Councillor Wahlen when he states:  
All the State subsidies in the world will never be able to replace the warmth of assistance 
rendered by one individual, one human being to another. Help given by the State is usually 
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anonymous and lacking in human compassion. It is man alone by his personal charity who can 
really bring succour to his neighbour in need.
220
 
 
If the demand of recognition is not heard, relief for refugees and IPDs will lack an 
essential dimension. It is the demand to be recognized as human beings that engenders 
responsibility for forced migrants such as refugees and IDPs. This responsibility is both 
individual and institutional. The most obvious ways to evoke a sense of responsibility for 
guaranteeing refugee rights would be through education and media. As long as refugees and 
IDPs are not recognized as one of us, as our fellow humans who share the same dignity, 
there will be little improvement in the treatment of issues related to them. That is why, 
instead of prescribing a list of things to do or not to do for refugees and IDPs, this reflection 
has instead suggested a way of being and dealing with refugees and IDPs which is based on 
the recognition of their human dignity. This stance pulls out beyond the facility of typical 
responses which are known in advance. Rather it engages in the complex path of 
discernment in order to honor the dignity of the forcibly displaced. Because human dignity 
is at stake in refugees and IDPs related issues, there is no shortcut. 
                                               
220 Friedrich Traugott Wahlen‘s address on the occasion of the award of the Nansen medal in 1963 quoted by 
Dieter B. Scholz, S.J., in Everybody’s Challenge. Essential Documents of Jesuit Refugee Service. 1980-2000, 
ed. Jesuit Refugee Service (Rome: Jesuit Refugee Service, 2000), 68. 
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